Afzal Upal has totally came out and explained the truth about Ahmadiyya. For other essays see here: https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/?s=Upal
You are welcome to read the new book by M. Afzal Upal
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at in the Lens of Cognitive Science of Religion
In the mid 1950s, a British taxi driver named George King claimed that Budha, Jesus, and Lao Tzu had been alien “cosmic masters” who had come to earth to teach mankind the right way to live. Sun Myung Moon claimed that Korean people are descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. Joseph Smith claimed that some lost tribes of Israel had moved to Americas hundreds of years ago. All three people successfully founded new religious movements that have survived to this day. How and why do some people come up with such seemingly strange and bizarre ideas and why do others come to place their faith in these ideas? The first part of this book develops a multidisciplinary theoretical framework drawn from cognitive science of religion and social psychology to answer these critically important questions. The second part of the book illustrates how this theoretical framework can be used to understand the origin and evolution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at founded by an Indian Muslim in 1889. The book breaks new ground by studying the influence that religious beliefs of 19th century reformist Indian Muslims, in particular, founders of the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, had on the beliefs of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at. Using the theoretical framework developed in part I, the book also explains why many north Indian Sunni Muslims found Ahmad’s ideas to be irresistible and why the movement split into two a few years Ahmad’s death. The book will interest those who want to understand cults as well as those who want to understand reformist Islamic movements.
Ahmadiyya sources and their Khalifa claim that #ahmadis are persecuted in #palestine, wherein in #Israel, #ahmadis are allowed full religious freedom. Nevertheless, in a recent edition of “this week with huzoor”, the Ahmadiyya Khalifa told the world that their is a Qadiani mission house in the West Bank, see at the 4:13 mark. Watch my video on this herein and my tik tok and instagram video.
#Ahmadis are not recognized as genuine Islamic by mainstream Muslims, faces persecution and experiences matrimonial restrictions imposed by local Sharia courts. Although no estimates are available, reports suggest that there may be “dozens” of Palestinian Ahmadi Muslims in the West Bank.
#Ahmadis have opened a mission house in Tulkarem, Palestine, which seems to be on the border of the West Bank and Israel. It is also a huge refugee area, thus, it seems that the Ahmadiyya movement is trying to get converts from this refugee camp area.
Ahmadiyya in Egypt started during the life of MGA, since Egypt was a British colony, MGA’s writings had reached there and were responded to by the famous Rashid Rida. Specifically, MGA’s book, I’jāz al-masīḥ (Miracle of the Messiah) was reviewed in several Egyptian periodicals. One such review which was critical of the work was reproduced and amplified in an Indian magazine by his detractors in response to which Ghulam Ahmad wrote the book Al-hudā wa al-tabṣiratu limań yarā (Guidance for Perceiving Minds). When, in 1902, Ghulam Ahmad instructed his followers to abstain from inoculating themselves against the plague, the move was criticised by the Egyptian nationalist and journalist Mustafa Kamil Pasha, editor of the newspaper al-Liwā (The Standard), in response to which Ghulam Ahmad authored the book Mawāhib al-raḥmān (Gifts of the Gracious [God]).
Continue reading “The history of #Ahmadiyya in Egypt”
The best approach to apostacy in Islam is via the Hanafi Fiqh in the Mughal Empire (the Ottomans seem to have a much more aggressive interpretation). MGA and his team of writers never commented clearly on apostacy in Islam and purposely. Apostacy in Islam is decided by islamic governments, not by people. In fact, the Mughal Empire and Ottoman Empire had their own unique interpretation of apostacy. In the Mughal Empire, penalty for Apostasy limited for those who cause Hirabah after leaving Islam, not for personal religion change.
Apostacy via the Hanafi Fiqh
Hanafi – recommends three days of imprisonment before execution, although the delay before killing the Muslim apostate is not mandatory. Apostates who are men must be killed, states the Hanafi Sunni fiqh, while women must be held in solitary confinement and beaten every three days till they recant and return to Islam. Penalty for Apostasy limited for those who cause Hirabah after leaving Islam, not for personal religion change.
Other schools of thought
Maliki – allows up to ten days for recantation, after which the apostate must be killed. Both men and women apostates deserve death penalty according to the traditional view of Sunni Maliki fiqh.Shafi’i – waiting period of three days is required to allow the Muslim apostate to repent and return to Islam. After the wait, execution is the traditional recommended punishment for both men and women apostates.Hanbali – waiting period not necessary, but may be granted. Execution is traditional recommended punishment for both genders of Muslim apostates.Ja’fari – waiting period not necessary, but may be granted according to this Shia fiqh. Male apostates must be executed, states the Jafari fiqh, while a female apostate must be held in solitary confinement till she repents and returns to Islam.
Inheritance and property rights for apostates were prohibited by Pakistan in 1963. In 1991, Tahir Iqbal, who had converted to Christianity from Islam, was arrested on charges of desecrating a copy of the Qur’an and making statements against Muhammad. While awaiting trial, he was denied bail on the presumption by a Sessions Court and the appeals Division of the Lahore High Court that conversion from Islam was a “cognizable offense”. This decision was upheld by the High Court. The judge hearing the case, Saban Mohyuddin, rejected the idea that Iqbal should be sentenced to death for conversion, saying that Iqbal could only be sentenced if it could be proven he had committed blasphemy. The case was then transferred away from Mohyuddin.
While there was no specific formal law prohibiting apostasy, the laws against apostasy have been effectuated through Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Under Article 295 of its penal code, any Pakistani Muslim who feels his or her religious feelings have been hurt, directly or indirectly, for any reason or any action of another Pakistani citizen can accuse blasphemy and open a criminal case against anyone. According to the Federal Shariat Court, the punishment for any type of blasphemy is death. AbdelFatteh Amor has observed that the Pakistani judiciary has tended to hold apostasy to be an offence, although Pakistanis have claimed otherwise. The UN expressed concern in 2002 that Pakistan was still issuing death sentences for apostasy.
The Apostasy Act 2006 was drafted and tabled before the National Assembly on 9 May 2007. The Bill provided an apostate with three days to repent or face execution. Although this Bill has not officially become law yet, it was not opposed by the government which sent it to the parliamentary committee for consideration. The principle in Pakistani criminal law is that a lacuna in the statute law is to be filled with Islamic law. In 2006 this had led Martin Lau to speculate that apostasy had already become a criminal offence in Pakistan.
In 2010 the Federal Shariat Court declared that apostasy is an offence covered by Hudood under the terms of Article 203DD of the Constitution. The Federal Shariat Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Hudood matters and no court or legislation can interfere in its jurisdiction or overturn its decisions. Even though apostasy is not covered in statutory law, the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over all Hudood matters regardless of whether there is an enacted law on them or not.
Other views on punishment
Various early Muslim scholars did not agree with the death penalty, among them Ibrahim al-Nakha’i (d. 715) and Sufyan al-Thawri and their followers, who rejected the death penalty for woman only and instead prescribed indefinite imprisonment until repentance. The Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi also called for different punishments between the non-seditious religious apostasy and that of seditious and political nature, or high treason.
Medieval Islamic scholars differed on the punishment of a female apostate: death, enslavement, or imprisonment until repentance. Abu Hanifa and his followers refused the death penalty for female apostates, supporting imprisonment until they re-embrace Islam. Hanafi scholars maintain that a female apostate should not be killed because it was forbidden to kill women under Sharia. In contrast, Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali and Ja’fari scholars interpreted other parts of Sharia to permit death as possible punishment for Muslim apostate women, in addition to confinement.
Contemporary reform Muslims such as Quranist Ahmed Subhy Mansour, Edip Yuksel, and Mohammed Shahrour have suffered from accusations of apostasy and demands to execute them, issued by Islamic clerics such as Mahmoud Ashur, Mustafa Al-Shak’a, Mohammed Ra’fat Othman and Yusif Al-Badri. Despite claiming to have received death threats, Edip Yuksel also believes that high-profile apostates who are controversial should be killed. He wrote, “Apostasy is not what gets one killed. It’s a combination of being controversial and having a high profile.”
Prominent recent examples of writers and activists killed because of apostasy claims include Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, executed by the Sudanese government, as thousands of demonstrators protested against his execution, and Faraj Foda, victim of Islamic extremists who were later arrested and imprisoned for 20 years. The Egyptian Nobel prize winner Najib Mahfouz was injured in an attempted assassination, paralyzing his right arm. The case of Abdul Rahman, an Afghan who converted from Islam to Christianity, sparked debate on the issue. While he initially faced the death penalty, he was eventually released as he was deemed mentally unfit to stand trial. Additionally, some, although not all Islamic states that do not directly execute converts from Islam sometimes instead indirectly facilitate extrajudicial killings performed by the apostate’s family, particularly if the apostate is vocal.
Opposition to execution
Over the centuries a number of prominent ulema, including the Maliki jurist Abu al-Walid al-Baji (d. 474 AH) held that apostasy is not a hadd crime and thus is liable only to a discretionary punishment (ta’zir). Some early authorities, such as Ibrahim al-Nakhai and Sufyan al-Thawri, as well as the Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi (d. 1090), believed that an apostate should be asked to repent indefinitely and never condemned to death. According to Sarakhsi, apostasy from Islam is a great offense, but its punishment is postponed until the Day of Judgement. The view that the Quran speaks only of otherworldly punishment for apostasy was also held by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar (1958–1963) Mahmud Shaltut, who held that the prescription of death penalty for apostasy found in hadith was aimed at prevention of aggression against Muslims and sedition against the state. Contemporary scholar Mirza Tahir Ahmad quotes a number of companions of Muhammad or early Islamic scholars (Ibn al-Humam, al-Marghinani, Ibn Abbas, Sarakhsi, Ibrahim al-Nakh’i) to argue that there was not an ijma (consensus among scholars or community) in favor of execution of murtadd in early Islam.
Contemporary Islamic Shafi`i jurists such as the Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa and fiqh scholar Taha Jabir Alalwani along with Shi’a jurists such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri and Grand Ayatollah Hussein Esmaeel al-Sadr and some jurists, scholars and writers of other Islamic sects,[who?] have argued or issued fatwas that the changing of religion is not punishable, but these minority opinions have not found broad acceptance among the majority of Islamic scholars. However others have successfully argued that the majority view, in both the past and the present, wasn’t a severe punishment for mere apostasy.
Javed Ahmad Ghamidi writes that punishment for apostasy was part of divine punishment for only those who denied the truth even after clarification in its ultimate form by Muhammad (Itmaam-i-hujjat), hence, he considers it a time-bound command and no longer punishable.
Tariq Ramadan states that given “the way the Prophet behaved with the people who left Islam (like Hishâm and ‘Ayyash) or who converted to Christianity (such as Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh), it should be stated that one who changes her/his religion should not be killed”. He further states that “there can be no compulsion or coercion in matters of faith not only because it is explicitly forbidden in the Qur’an but also because free conscious and choice and willing submission are foundational to the first pillar (declaration of faith) and essential to the very definition of Islam. Therefore, someone leaving Islam or converting to another religion must be free to do so and her/his choice must be respected.”
Reza Aslan argues that the idea that apostasy is treason rather than exercise of freedom of religion is not so much part of Islam, as part of the pre-modern era when classical Islamic fiqh was developed, and when “every religion was a ‘religion of the sword'”.
This was also an era in which religion and the state were one unified entity. … no Jew, Christian, Zoroastrian, or Muslim of this time would have considered his or her religion to be rooted in the personal confessional experiences of individuals. … Your religion was your ethnicity, your culture, and your social identity… your religion was your citizenship.
- The Holy Roman Empire had its officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Christianity
- The Sasanian Empire had its officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Zoroastrianism.
- while in China, Buddhist rulers fought Taoist rulers for political ascendancy.
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, a minority sect found in South and Southeast Asia, rejects any form of punishment for apostasy whatsoever in this world, citing hadith, Quran, and the opinions of classical Islamic jurists to justify its views. However, Ahmadiyya Muslims are widely considered as non-Muslim apostates and persecuted by mainstream Islam, because of their beliefs.
There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the Shaitan and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the firmest handle, which shall not break off, and Allah is Hearing, Knowing.
Say, “The truth is from your Lord”: Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject (it): for the wrong-doers We have prepared a Fire whose (smoke and flames), like the walls and roof of a tent, will hem them in: if they implore relief they will be granted water like melted brass, that will scald their faces, how dreadful the drink! How uncomfortable a couch to recline on!
And if your Lord had pleased, surely all those who are in the earth would have believed, all of them; will you then force men till they become believers?
Therefore do remind, for you are only a reminder. You are not a watcher over them;
He said: “O my people! See ye if (it be that) I have a Clear Sign from my Lord, and that He hath sent Mercy unto me from His own presence, but that the Mercy hath been obscured from your sight? shall we compel you to accept it when ye are averse to it?
Jonathan A.C. Brown explains that “According to all the theories of language elaborated by Muslim legal scholars, the Qur’anic proclamation that ‘There is no compulsion in religion. The right path has been distinguished from error’ is as absolute and universal a statement as one finds. The truth had been made clear, and now, ‘Whoever wants, let him believe, and whoever wants, let him disbelieve,’ the holy book continues (2:256, 18:29). “, and hence the Qur’an granted religious freedom. Peters and Vries, in contrast, write that the Quranic verse 2:256 was traditionally interpreted in a different way, considered abrogated (suspended and overruled) by later verses of Quran by some classical scholars. Peters and Vries note that some interpreted this verse has been that it “forbids compulsion to things that are wrong but not compulsion to accept the truth”. However, that isn’t true since Muslim scholars have established the abrogated verses and (2:256) isn’t among them, moreover, many Qur’anic commentators and Muslim scholars interpret (2:256) by reasoning that the truth of Islam is so self-evident that no one is in need of being coerced into it; and embracing Islam because of coercion would not benefit the convert in any case.
Khaled Abou El Fadl claims that the verses (88:21–22) emphasizes that even Muhammad does not have the right to think of himself as a warden who has the power to coerce people. This is reaffirmed by many of the historical reports regarding the Qur’anic revelation that emphasize that belief and conviction cannot be coerced. He further states that moderates consider the verse (2:256) to be enunciating a general, overriding principle that cannot be contradicted by isolated traditions attributed to the Prophet. He concludes that moderates do not believe that there is any punishment that attaches to apostasy.
S. A. Rahman, a former Chief Justice of Pakistan, argues that there is no indication of the death penalty for apostasy in the Qur’an. W. Heffening states that “in the Qur’an the apostate is threatened with punishment in the next world only.” Wael Hallaq holds that nothing in the law governing apostate and apostasy derives from the letter of Quran. The late dissenting Shia jurist Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri stated that the Quranic verses do not prescribe an earthly penalty for apostasy.
Islamist author Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi argued that verses [Quran 9:11] of the Qur’an sanction death for apostasy. In contrast, Pakistan’s jurist S. A. Rahman states “that not only is there no punishment for apostasy provided in the Book but that the Word of God clearly envisages the natural death of the apostate. He will be punished only in the Hereafter…” Rahman also highlights that there is no reference to the death penalty in any of the 20 instances of apostasy mentioned in the Qur’an. Ahmet Albayrak explains in The Qur’an: An Encyclopedia that regarding apostasy as a wrongdoing is not a sign of intolerance of other religions, and is not aimed at one’s freedom to choose a religion or to leave Islam and embrace another faith, but that on the contrary, it is more correct to say that the punishment is enforced as a safety precaution when warranted if apostasy becomes a mechanism of public disobedience and disorder (fitna). At this point, what is punished is the action of ridiculing the high moral flavour of Islam and posing a threat to public order. Otherwise, Islam prohibits spying on people and investigating their private lives, beliefs and personal opinions.
Writing in the Encyclopedia of Islam, Heffening holds that contrary to the Qur’an, “in traditions [i.e. hadith], there is little echo of these punishments in the next world… and instead, we have in many traditions a new element, the death penalty.”[page needed] Wael Hallaq states the death penalty reflects a later reality and does not stand in accord with the deeds of Muhammad.
Ayatollah Montazeri holds that it is probable that the punishment was prescribed by Muhammad during early Islam to combat political conspiracies against Islam and Muslims, and is not intended for those who simply change their belief or express a change in belief. Montazeri defines different types of apostasy; he argues that capital punishment should be reserved for those who desert Islam out of malice and enmity towards the Muslim community, and not those who convert to another religion after investigation and research.
The charge of apostasy is often used by religious authorities to condemn and punish skeptics, dissidents, and minorities in their communities. From the earliest history of Islam, the crime of apostasy and execution for apostasy has driven major events in Islam. For example, the Ridda wars (civil wars of apostasy) shook the Muslim community in 632–633 AD, immediately after the death of Muhammad. These apostasy wars split the two major sects of Islam – Sunni and Shia, and caused numerous deaths. Sunni and Shia sects of Islam have long called each other as apostates of Islam.
The term Zindīq refers to a freethinker, atheist or a heretic. Originally it referred to a dualist and also the Manichaeans, whose religion for a time threatened to become the dominant religion of the educated class and who experienced a wave of persecutions from 779 to 786. A history of those times states:
“Tolerance is laudable”, the Spiller (the Caliph Abu al-Abbās) had once said, “except in matters dangerous to religious beliefs, or to the Sovereign’s dignity.” Mahdi (d. 169/785) persecuted Freethinkers, and executed them in large numbers. He was the first Caliph to order composition of polemical works to in refutation of Freethinkers and other heretics; and for years he tried to exterminate them absolutely, hunting them down throughout all provinces and putting accused persons to death on mere suspicion.
The New Encyclopedia of Islam states that after the early period, with some notable exceptions, the practice in Islam regarding atheism or various forms of heresy, grew more tolerant as long as it was a private matter. However heresy and atheism expressed in public may well be considered a scandal and a menace to a society; in some societies they are punishable, at least to the extent the perpetrator is silenced. In particular, blasphemy against God and insulting Muhammad are major crimes.
From the 7th century through the 18th century, atheists, materialists, Sufi, and Shii sects were accused and executed for apostasy in Islam. In the 8th century, apostates of Islam were killed in West Asia and Sind. 10th-century Iraq, Sufi mystic Al-Hallaj was executed for apostasy; in 12th-century Iran, al-Suhrawardi along with followers of Ismaili sect of Islam were killed on charges of being apostates; in 14th-century Syria, Ibn Taymiyyah declared Central Asian Turko-Mongol Muslims as apostates due to the invasion of Ghazan Khan; in 17th-century India, Dara Shikoh and other sons of Shah Jahan were captured and executed on charges of apostasy from Islam by his brother Aurangzeb.
Other sources say that executions of apostates have been “rare in Islamic history”. While Al-Hallaj was officially executed for possessing a heretical document suggesting hajj pilgrimage was not required of a pure Muslim, it is thought he would have been spared execution except that the Caliph at the time Al-Muqtadir wished to discredit “certain figures who had associated themselves” with al-Hallaj. (Previously al-Hallaj had been punished for talking about being at one with God by being shaved, pilloried and beaten with the flat of a sword. He was not executed because the Shafi’ite judge had ruled that his words were not “proof of disbelief.”) According to historian Bernard Lewis, in the “early times” of Islam, “charges of apostasy were not unusual, and … the terms ‘unbeliever’ and ‘apostate’ were commonly used in religious polemic … in fact such accusations had little practical effect. The accused were for the most part unmolested, and some even held high offices in the Muslim state. As the rules and penalties of the Muslim law were systematized and more regularly enforced, charges of apostasy became rarer.” When action was taken against an alleged apostate, it was much more likely to be “quarantine” than execution, unless the innovation was “extreme, persistent and aggressive”.
During the colonial era, death for apostasy was abolished in many Muslim-majority colonies. Similarly, under intense European pressure, death sentence for apostasy from Islam was abolished by the Edict of Toleration, and substituted with other forms of punishment by the Ottoman government in 1844; the implementation of this ban was resisted by religious officials and proved difficult. A series of edicts followed during Ottoman’s Tanzimat period, such as the 1856 Reform Edict. Despite these edicts, there was constant pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam, and apostates from Islam continued to be persecuted, punished and threatened with execution, particularly in eastern and Levant parts of the then Ottoman Empire. The Edict of Toleration ultimately failed when Sultan Abdul Hamid II assumed power, re-asserted pan-Islamism with sharia as Ottoman state philosophy, and initiated Hamidian massacres in 1894 against Christians, particularly of Armenians, Assyrians and crypto-Christian apostates from Islam in Turkey (Stavriotes, Kromlides).[not specific enough to verify]
In “recent decades” before 2006, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom listed four cases of execution for apostasy in the Muslim world: one in Sudan in 1985; two in Iran, in 1989 and 1998; and one in Saudi Arabia in 1992.
Apostasy in the recent past
More than 20 Muslim-majority states have laws that declare apostasy by Muslims to be a crime. As of 2014, apostasy was a capital offense in Afghanistan, Brunei, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Executions for religious conversion have been infrequent in recent times, with four cases reported since 1985: one in Sudan in 1985; two in Iran, in 1989 and 1998; and one in Saudi Arabia in 1992. In Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen apostasy laws have been used to charge persons for acts other than conversion. In addition, some predominantly Islamic countries without laws specifically addressing apostasy have prosecuted individuals or minorities for apostasy using broadly-defined blasphemy laws. In many nations, the Hisbah doctrine of Islam has traditionally allowed any Muslim to accuse another Muslim or ex-Muslim for beliefs that may harm Islamic society. This principle has been used in countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and others to bring blasphemy charges against apostates.
The violence or threats of violence against apostates in the Muslim world in recent years has derived primarily not from government authorities but from other individuals or groups operating unrestricted by the government.[page needed] There has also been social persecution for Muslims converting to Christianity. For example, the Christian organisation Barnabas Fund reports:
The field of apostasy and blasphemy and related “crimes” is thus obviously a complex syndrome within all Muslim societies which touches a raw nerve and always arouses great emotional outbursts against the perceived acts of treason, betrayal and attacks on Islam and its honour. While there are a few brave dissenting voices within Muslim societies, the threat of the application of the apostasy and blasphemy laws against any who criticize its application is an efficient weapon used to intimidate opponents, silence criticism, punish rivals, reject innovations and reform, and keep non-Muslim communities in their place.
A survey based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 80 languages by the Pew Research Center between 2008 and 2012 among thousands of Muslims in many countries, found varied views on the death penalty for those who leave Islam to become an atheist or to convert to another religion. In some countries (especially in Central Asia, Southeast Europe, and Turkey), support for the death penalty for apostasy was confined to a tiny fringe; in other countries (especially in the Arab world and South Asia) majorities and large minorities support the death penalty.
In the survey, Muslims who favored making Sharia the law of the land were asked for their views on the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. The results are summarized in the table below. Note that values for Group C have been derived from the values for the other two groups and are not part of the Pew report.
Links and Related Essay’s
#apostacyinislam #ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog
#ahmadis are being brainwashed by their clerics/mullahs on a daily basis. These Ahmadi mullahs tell stories of how MGA got Lekh Ram killed, how Athim was killed, and etc etc etc. This is the psychology of the #ahmadi. They are thus hell-bent on attacking their critics, specifically the #exAhmadimovement. #ahmadis outside of Pakistan regularly spend their time harrassing, persecuting, maligning, falsely accusing, and praying for the death of all ex-Ahmadi’s and with their jamaat’s approval (secret approval). Ironically, #ahmadis have been crying about persecution in Pakistan since 1974 and even since 1953. #Ahmadis have cried persecution since 1953 in Pakistan and 1974 specifically. However, this is not authentic, its not true, its mostly self-generated persecution, in lieu of asylum cases. There is one more reason, MGA (and his team) wrote in their books that all of their opponents would be humiliated and would die miserably, thus, 99% of #ahmadis are no better than the taliban and Afzal Upal was correct to label them as Moderate Fundamentalist. In the below, we have posted the relevant quotes.
The quotes from MGA
[Announcement of January 3, 1899, Majmu‘ah Ishtiharat, vol. 3, p. 92,](Via Tadhkirah)
“”In the announcement of November 21, 1898… the following revelation was set forth for the unjust and lying party:
[Arabic] The recompense of evil is a penalty in proportion thereto and they will be humiliated.
That is to say that the unjust one will be afflicted with a penalty, the like of the evil that he did to the other side. Today that prophecy has been completely fulfilled. Maulavi Muhammad Husain had reviled me and humiliated me, he called me a disbeliever, Antichrist, liar and a perverter and had an edict prepared on those lines against me by the maulavi of Punjab and India. On that basis he persuaded Muhammad Bakhsh Ja‘far Zatali and others of Lahore to calumniate me and the members of my family. So now a similar edict has been issued against Muhammad Husain himself by the maulavis of Punjab and India including his own master and teacher Nadhir Husain. They have stated that he is a liar, Antichrist, impostor, disbeliever, innovator, and that he is outside the pale of Ahl-e-Sunnat and indeed outside the pale of Islam.”””
[Amin of Bashir Ahmad, Sharif Ahmad and Mubarakah Begum,
November 27, 1901, al-Hakam, vol. 5, no. 45, December 10, 1901, pp. 3–4](Via Tadhkirah)
[Urdu verses by the Promised Messiah[as]:]
In a dream, it has been conveyed to me that she will attain to high rank.
She will have a title of honour which has been determined for her from the beginning;
May my children never find themselves helpless or afflicted or sorrowful;
May I see all of them righteous before my death;
You have bestowed this good news upon me already. Holy is He Who has humiliated my enemies; I recall Your bounties O, God. You gave me good news and then bestowed these children;
You gave me the assurance that they will not face ruin and that they will grow and increase like box-trees in a garden;
Often have you given me this news. Holy, is He Who has humiliated my enemies;
You have given me the good news: One of your sons will one day be My beloved;
From that moon, I shall remove all darkness. I shall demonstrate that through him I have turned around a whole universe;
This good news is a nourishment for my heart. Holy is He Who has humiliated my enemies;
An hour is coming which will be reminiscent of the Judgment Day.
My Lord has told me that.
Holy is He Who has humiliated my enemies.
[Badr, vol. 2, no. 23, June 7, 1906, p. 2 and
al-Hakam, vol. 10, no. 20, June 10, 1906, p. 1]
June 5, 1906
Translation: (1) [Arabic] No Prophet has been sent, except that Allah has humiliated on his account those who do not believe.
2) [Translation] [Arabic] God sends down His Spirit of prophethood on whomsoever He wills from among His servants.
(3) [Urdu] What a high design has been accomplished by God’s feeling and His Seal.
[Announcement November 5, 1907, published in al-Hakam, vol. 11, no. 40, November 10,
1907, p. 6, Majmu‘ah Ishtiharat, vol. 3, p. 590](Via Tadhkirah)
[Urdu] The humiliation and destruction of your opponents was destined to be at your hands.
This means that those who desired to humiliate and destroy me, will themselves be humiliated
[Nuzulul-Masih, p. 189, Ruhani Khaza’in, vol. 18, p. 567](Via Tadhkirah)
That is [Arabic] I shall humiliate him who designs to humiliate you.
This is a grand revelation and prophecy which has been fulfilled in various ways and in respect of diverse nations. Whoever attempted to bring my Movement into contempt
was himself humiliated and frustrated.
Links and Related Essay’s
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Mosqueattack #trueislam #atifmian #aryasamaj #lekhram
Muhammad Zafrullah Khan seems to have written a controversial book in 1972 (published in 1974) entitled “Agony of Pakistan”. This book is not on alislam.org. In this book, he urged the Government to guide its citizens in promoting Islamic way of life, observe Islamic moral standards and provide teachings of the Quran and Islamic studies for Muslims of Pakistan. Back in 1948 and 1949, Zafrullah Khan even supported the famous “objective resolution”. Zafrullah’s defense of the objective resolution after a Hindu member Bhupendra Kumar Datta criticized it. Zafrullah Khan wasn’t the only Ahmadi to ask for this. The Musleh Maud (2nd Khalifa) said so repeatedly. MGA even asked for laws to punish blasphemers. Ahmadis-the moderate fundamentalists-pioneered the very Islamization of Pakistan they now decry
Links and Related Essay’s
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Mosqueattack #trueislam #atifmian
Nicholas H. A. Evans has recently published a book about Qadian and Ahmadis in 2020, this is based on ethnographic research that he conducted in 2011-2012 in and around Qadian (field work). “Far from the Caliph’s Gaze: Being Ahmadi Muslim in the Holy City of Qadian” by Nicholas H. A. Evans. Evan’s is a research professor at London School of Economics and Political Science, he works in the Department of Anthropology.
He writes that Ahmadi’s invited the RSS (a hindu nationalist group, known for killing Muslims) to the Jalsa every years at Qadian, since they shared enemies, i.e., the Muslims of India and the world.
He was kicked out of Qadian about half way through his work and forced to go and meet the caliph in London, he was treated terrible and he was frustrated.
He called Ahmadi’s as “excessively-certain” about their Caliph and their religion.
He was told that there are 80–200,000 Ahmadi’s, in India(which is a huge exaggeration). He didn’t address the fact that the Khalifa had announced 40 million converts to Ahmadiyya from India alone.
He was told that Ahmadi’s love the persecution, and many have converted only because of it.
Ahmadi Women in Qadian are forced to wear full burqa, just like Rabwah.
He makes many mistakes, and obviously, it takes 15 years of reading to learn Ahmadiyya. For example, he claims that the issues of Khilafat happened at the death of the first Khalifa, however, this is not true, the issues started in 1909. He also claims that when Ahmadi’s became non-Muslim, the government of Pakistan criminalized the belief against Khatme-Nubuwwat, however, this is not true, being an Ahmadi in Pakistan is not a crime, apostacy is not a crime either.
- He was not allowed to speak to any of the Ahmadi-women at Qadian.
His previous articles that are related to research for this book: “Beyond cultural intimacy: The tensions that make truth for India’s Ahmadi Muslims” and “Witnessing a potent truth: rethinking responsibility in the anthropology of theisms”.
He discovered the nature of Ahmadiyya Movement (a personality cult) and it’s relationship with belief, truth and theatrics around all this. It seems that after introduction he will be exposing contradictions, hypocrisy, lack of empathy, opportunism, propaganda techniques etc. with examples. It will be a must read book and will prove to be the best explanation so far of the Ahmadiyya Movement using a scientific approach.
Noteworthy passage from the introduction of this book can be read below and everything that will come next will revolve around this:
“A standard approach to studying insular religious sects has thus been to investigate the mechanisms through which these sects manage to erase doubts in the minds of their followers. Scholars of religion have consequently asked how certainty gets produced and what bearing it has on the relative flourishing or failure of new religious movements. Fundamentally, the question becomes: What kinds of coercion and control are necessary for people to act in this way? Therefore, where doubt is not present, its absence is assumed to require explanation and quite possibly condemnation. We assume that doubt must be a central problem for the religious, and when the religious do not appear to be afflicted by it, its absence becomes a major problem for our analysis. The Ahmadiyya Jama‘at is one example of a religious organization that would, in standard sociological theory, be seen to contain numerous “plausibility structures” to maintain certainty and ward off doubt. Their conviction would be seen as ‘unreal’ unless enforced through social mechanisms that effectively curtail people’s natural inclinations toward skepticism.
…I have sought to show that, even though my interlocutors do not problematize their ability to either know or believe in truth (i.e., they entertained neither first- nor second-order doubts), their relationship to truth is far from untroubled. This is because they find themselves in the position of asking what they might owe to truth and whether they can fulfill their obligations to that truth.”
At the very core of the book is the question of how, given that Ahmadis define their Muslimness in large part through a personal relationship with khilafat, Ahmadis in Qadian differ from Ahmadis elsewhere in maintaining this relationship, despite the physical and administrative distance over the past 75 years between khilafat and Qadian.
The author, Nicholas Evans, spent 15 months living in Qadian and meeting with Ahmadis, including murabbis. He also specifically obtained permission from Mirza Masroor Ahmad to write the book. I read the book largely for insight into how the jamaat operates, as well as for an academic account of Ahmadi life in Qadian and the unique qualities of Ahmadiyyat, for better or for worse.
This book differs other books on the topic in that it doesn’t take Ahmadi claims at face value without commenting on how unique or unstable these claims are, as well as how the jamaat consciously created its administrative structure and distinct internal culture during the second caliphate. Evans is quite fond of the Ahmadis he meets and comes to know, who I’m sure were very kind and hospitable, but he is also not writing PR-type material for Ahmadis as ‘the good Muslims’ or ‘the moderate Muslims’, as is so often the case with Westerners who write about Ahmadiyyat.
There are so many themes to discuss in this book and each of them could (and perhaps should) be its own post. I would just like to focus on a few themes that jumped out to me: the jamaat bureaucracy, the aesthetics of Ahmadiyyat, and the inside/outside distinction in what defines Ahmadiyyat.
When Evans first arrived in Qadian, he attended the Qadian jalsa and was interviewed as a guest from the UK. However, since he had traveled to Qadian on his own, the UK jamaat was not aware of his visit and had not sanctioned it, which caused a panic. Later on, when he is about to begin a year-long field study where he will live in Qadian, even though the Indian jamaat is fairly familiar with him and his research, he is required to travel back to the UK to personally meet with Mirza Masroor Ahmad to obtain approval.
Evans describes in detail what must be charitably considered as the cumbersome bureaucracy of the jamaat, where literally every single appointment for every single jamaat around the world must personally be approved by the caliph, as though he has personal knowledge of the person who has been nominated for a role by election. Evans describes this, for Ahmadis, as continuing a personal relationship with the divine, but if we are to adopt the ordinary community model for Ahmadiyyat that its apologists so often use when defending its arbitrary rules, what ordinary organization, whether it’s a lawn bowling club or a multinational corporation, has its chief executive personally approve thousands of appointments every single year?
Finally, Evans touches gently on the absurd number of conversions claimed by the jamaat in the late 90s, providing evidence against the claim that this was overenthusiastic reporting at the local or national level, but as a way of fulfilling a powerful prophecy issued by Mirza Tahir Ahmad:
Badr had printed a sermon from March 26, 1999, in which Tahir Ahmad had expressed absolute certainty that within a year, ten million people would join the Jama‘at. Likewise, an article from January 1999 noted that the caliph had reported the extraordinary progress of the Jama‘at in India such that within the first four months of the year, there had been 253,283 converts, over twice the figure for the first four months of the previous year. Given that even today, there are unlikely to be more than 200,000 Ahmadis in India and that Indian conversion figures for 2008–09 and 2009–10 were 2,417 and 2,761 respectively, the 1999 figure is presumably fanciful.
Evans also examines the aesthetics of the jamaat, which I had never thought about until I read Nuzhat Haneef’s treatment of how the caliphs dress. The achkhan and turban is not how they normally dressed prior to becoming caliph and also not rooted in Islam, leaving Haneef to conclude that the clothes almost always worn by the caliphs must represent what such clothes typically represent, i.e. status in feudal Punjabi society, or chaudhrahat.
Evans talks briefly about how ordinary Ahmadis look and dress, and he also has a chapter called Televising Islam, but what I found most remarkable was his treatment of the international bait every summer. I have seen this and participated in it, but I had never stopped to consider that this was a highly choreographed event designed to have maximum impact on television, not unlike a well-produced TV show. The camera angles, the images, the prominent positioning of Ahmadis visibly not of Pakistani heritage, the long lines of people and the use of microphones to intentionally record the language of the international bait repeated in multiple languages are all designed to create a spiritual experience.
This is not a spontaneous spiritual experience, but a consciously-designed, curated and delivered experience and owes as much to the caliph and his theology as it does to the skilled TV people in the jamaat. It’s also hard to read this and not feel like this is a bidat that has been grafted onto orthodox Islam as a modern institution, not without merits, but without an anchor in the original Islam.
This is the single annual moment of combined ritual in which all Ahmadis around the world are expected to synchronously participate. Unlike its formal counterpart, it retains elements of the original Sufi ritual of initiation, which was performed to create a link between devotee and master.56
The International Bai‘at was first staged in 1993, and it has since developed a very particular aesthetic form that is repeated, year after year, during its MTA broadcast.57
In what follows, I describe it as a global ritual because it cannot be understood if viewed as simply a broadcast to which Ahmadis in Qadian responded. Rather, technical aspects of the live television broadcast needed to be performed correctly, and their improper implementation could lead to ritual failure. Camera angles, video editing, and even the placement of microphones and the sound mixing are parts of the ritual performance of this International Bai‘at, as much as the responses of people sitting in the mosque in Qadian.
3. Differences in Private/Public Discourse
Finally, Evans describes the inside/outside distinction in Ahmadi discourse, which is something all of us intuitively know as the difference between a sermon at an Ahmadi mosque on a Friday or a speech in Urdu at a local general body meeting and English-language material or presentation for interfaith events or at the jalsa salanas when dignitaries are present. It is undeniable that the original works of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad were aggressive and bombastic, but he was aggressively out to prove that Islam, particularly his own interpretation, was superior to every other interpretation of every other religion. His work was chiefly devoted to this end and these are the vicious, bruising polemics you hear at internal events. At external events, however, the story is different:
For Ahmadis living in Qadian and speaking Urdu, Ghulam Ahmad’s ferocious polemics are celebrated and emulated (see chapter 3). It is only as discourse is shifted to English—when the Jama‘at hopes to speak to India’s cosmopolitan urban centers or foreign audiences—that polemics cease to be celebrated and Ahmadis focus solely on the simple message that Islam is a religion of peace. I am not the first to note this discrepancy. The theologian Yohanan Friedmann, writes, “In its relationship with the non-Muslim world, however, the Aḥmadiyya is primarily engaged in defending Islam and depicting it as a liberal, humane, and progressive religion, wrongfully calumnied by non-Muslims.
One other subtle but noticeably noxious, disingenuous phenomenon is the Ahmadi coverage of Mirza Masroor Ahmad meeting with foreign leaders as one-way opportunities to learn from the caliph, not conversations between two equals:
The caliph is simultaneously aloof from and yet deeply involved in worldly politics. In Britain, where the caliph resides, but also during his tours of other countries, the Jama‘at work hard to arrange meetings and audiences between the caliph and secular authorities. These meetings are nonetheless never constructed as two-way exchanges. Rather, as in the case of the saint described by Werbner, the caliph alone is seen to give. He addresses politicians, and in doing so he gifts them his message of justice and peace. As I will show in chapter 5, Jama‘at reportage of these events—both in print and on their satellite television channel—is above all concerned to present these politicians as witnesses, not interlocutors. The emphasis is always on their reactions to the caliph’s message and his personage.
“When (Indian) partition first began to seem inevitable, the caliph lobbied for QADIAN to become an INDEPENDENT PRINCELY STATE, but this soon became obviously impractical”.
..They build an empire for themselves, name their residence “Kasray Khilafat” that literally means the “Palace of Khilafat.” Qadian, Rabwah, Tilford aka Islamabad UK.
“”The historian Ayesha Jalal, described how Mahmood Ahmad’s efforts to unify, ‘temporal and spiritual authority’, overstepped what was acceptable to many Muslims, for Mahmud Ahmad was increasingly, ‘running the local administration on the lines of an Ahmadi mafia’.””
Even Nicholas Evans writes that in the #AMJ, chanda is mandatory, even non-working Ahmadi women of Qadian are forced to pay. Non-payment will result in getting kicked out of Ahmadiyya. See Chapter-1
Nicholas H. A. Evans from the London School of Economics has released a Book titled “Far from the Caliph’s Gaze: Being Ahmadi Muslim in the Holy City of Qadian”.
You can read the full text here: https://muse.jhu.edu/book/74158/
The merit of this Book is:
We have a Non-Pakistani, uncontroversial and white academic dealing with Ahmadis, so his work can not be attacked as being prejudiced. On the contrary despite having actually seen the real face of the Qadiani sect at their roots first hand, he remains painfully neutral. Even when it would be good to highlight the explosiveness of his research, re remains neutral as if he was dissecting a dead lab rat. That is maybe only possible when you have no personal history with the Qadianis and juts have to deal with them as a research object like a dead rat. Lucky you Mr. Evans.
For his purposes this appears probably to be the correct way, as his research is mainly interested in how Qadianis have been able to cultivate a following that is incapable of doubt or better said does not dare to doubt. Thus his language remains civilized and he uses very euphemistic words to describe the sneaky methods the Qadianis have employed and you have to read between the lines to understand what he is saying. So unfortunately you will not find the colorful language of a Mad Mullah, that would have been fitting to describe the Qadiani methods in this book. But nevertheless, this Book has some interesting points to consider.
The main points of this book are:
Qadianis are incapable or do not dare to doubting like normal humans would. Qadianis share a common secret, that they are living a lie, but despite that knowledge, they continue to live it and keep convincing themselves by keeping a façade alive.
Qadiani Mirzas meets with politicians in a way Pakistani Pirs and holy men do. He is only ever shown to lecture people and never shown to be lectured. Like North Koreas Kim. The Interfaith Symposiums and Qadiani Meetings are organized, recorded and transmitted in a way that the Mirza appears to be the lecturer.
Despite claiming to be non-political, the Qadiani Mirza’s outlined a New World Order in his book “Nizam-e-Nau” during World War 2. In it the Mirza wanted to replace Capitalism and Communism with Wasiyyat. According to his plans, he wanted the whole world to be subscribed to Wasiyyat, and he be the benefeciarry.
Mahmood Ahmad envisioned that if everybody were to give one-third of their assets in this way, in a few generations, most property would have accumulated in the hands of the Jama‘at for the benefit of all humanity.
“Wasiyyat is going to replace capitalism.”
In 1943 Zafrullah Khan, made a English translation of this Ahmadiyya “New World Order”—a mere year after the original Urdu lecture—and yet it contained substantial differences, the most obvious of which was its distinctive new subtitle, New World Order of Islam. It was translated by Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, the highest-profile Ahmadi of his day, who after partition became the first foreign minister of Pakistan.
This shows that Zafrullah Khan was never fit to be a high ranking politician in the first place and was working with his leader the Mirza to advance a Qadiani agenda. The appointment of Zafrulla as Pakistans foreign mister was done under English pressure.
In Nizam-e- Nau the Ahmadiyya caliphate is not presented as a direct successor to worldly political systems: rather, the caliphate is seen to give rise to a private relationship of devotion that has the power to render secular politics defunct.
In other Words, the Qadiani Leaders do not bother with the secular political system, because they want to control people the way they control their own followers through an unconditional oath in which their followers swear to be obedient until death and give property, offspring and life to the command of the Ahmadiyya Caliph.
For many Ahmadis, the fact that the role of Caliph has remained within a single family is felt to be evidence of the efficacy and incorruptibility of their electoral process: it is evidence of the fact that God is indeed responsible for the election of the caliph.
For Qadianis in Qadian, the political problems of the world were overwhelmingly understood to have arisen due to governments and people ignoring the message of the caliphate.
In Qadian, the future of the world and the dawning of a new global order are said to rest on the willingness of individuals and nations to embrace the caliph as their one true global leader.
Yet in spite of the extensive nature of the Jama‘at system in Qadian, the history of the town since 1947 has left it in a uniquely isolated position from the global caliphate. The Point: The Ahmadiyya sect envisions a New World Order for the whole world, but their Main centers Qadian and Rabwah, where they have established their rules are cesspools of rape and sodomy.
Qadianis thus desire to live under the benign authoritarianism of their leader, which they see as a benevolent and sacred form of sovereignty. From him, material and spiritual gifts flow (via the administrative system of the global Jama‘at), and in return Ahmadis offer their obedience. This is a model of sovereignty that draws extensively on older South Asian models of kingship, premised on a personal relationship of unequal reciprocity in which the justice of the sovereign is made available to his people through the act of petitioning.
The relationship and immediacy between caliph and follower be recognized as no more than a pious fiction. Because Qadianis believe that the Caliph responds to every letter they write or controls everything. In truth it is the bureaucracy that controls it. But Qadianis believe that their Caliph in superhuman and capable of reading thousands of letters and faxes a day.
Regarding Qadiani claim that Jesuas was in Kashmir: the journalist spoke of Ahmadi arguments regarding Jesus as if they were court-admissible evidence, not just in their status as the doctrine of one particular community but as proofs that might be counted as evidence within the court.
About how Qadianis tend to erase failed mubahalas: The response I got was again the same; they neither knew about the mubahala, nor did they seem to think it was important to find out anything more about the result. This was puzzling. I knew that my interlocutors cared deeply about demonstrating the truth of Ahmadiyya. Once a prophecy fails, Qadianis get collective amnesic and do as if there never was any such prophecy.
Qadianis yearn and pray for confrontation as it allows them to play the victim card and gives them cheap publicity they would otherwise have to pay themselves. They hope that Confrontation with Ahmadis will increase also in places like Europe.
The murder of Asad Shah in Glasgow had an interesting angle that the Qadini sect exploited to play the victim. Asad Shah was insane and was claiming to be a prophet himself for decades. He had written letters to the Ahamdiyya Khalifas to accept them and had posted youtube videos and that was the reason he was killed and not because he was Ahmadi or not. Regardless of that, the Ahmaidyya sect exploited this situation to play the victim and get cheap publicity. I’ll write about it in a separate post.
So this books has some interesting points to make and is worth a read.
But I have some criticism.
The author remains very superficial and the subjects that the touches like Ahmadis using TV and Press to defraud or convince themselves and their own members and the public are maybe some minor points compared to other subjects in regards to Ahmadiyya.
The author shies away from the really interesting parts of the Ahmadiyya ideology and history. For example he writes in lengths about the trickeries the Ahmaidys employed in continuously amending the conditions of mubahala until no one was able to fulfill them so that they would always have a way to talk them out about any outcome of any such death prophecy.
Interesting subjects such as Muhammdi Begum or the Sun and Moon Eclipse are completely missing in his book.
Also the matter about the fake conversion numbers are mainly ignored. He only mentiones it in one paragraph that in one year the India Jamaat claimed to have a few hundred thousand converts, but that appeared to be impossible as even nowadays he can only count 2000 converts a year. The fact that at the peak the Ahmadiyya sect had claimed to have 40 Million converts in a single year alone is completely ignored by Mr. Evans. it would have been interetsing to research how these insane figures were derived and how the Ahmadiyya sect and its members dealt with tuning down the conversions figures from millions to a few thousand and forgetting it all together?!
And finally he claims that he also interviewed the current Qadiani Caliph, but there is nothing in his book about any such interview. It would have been interesting to read about his interview. Unfortunately after this book, I doubt that Mr. Evans will get the opportunity to interview the Mirza.
Probably it is too much to aks for from an outsider to touch on all those subjects and we shall be happy with what Mr. Evans managed to research.
Also this Books shows that once you deal a little bit with the Ahmadiyya sect, you will eventually be able see the real face of the ahmadiyya sect. Maybe Mr. Trudeau would do his homework before next time he compares Canada with the Ahmadiya sect.
So Mr. Evans please keep digging the dirty Ahmadiyya hole and you will pull out more dirt than you can imagine.
#IStandWithAhmadis #EndAhmadiPersecution #FaisalabadMosqueAttack #NayaPakistan#GhaseetPura #SaveAhmadis #ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #ahmadiyyat #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Mosqueattack #islam #trueislam #khalifaofislam Kashif N Chaudhry @KashifMD Qasim Rashid Esq. @MuslimIQ kashifmd.com Rabwah Times @RabwahTimes Atif Mian @AtifRMian rabwah.net persecutionofahmadis.org thepersecution.org alislam.org mta.tv ahmadiyya-islam.org loveforallhatredfornone.org ahmadiyya.us ahmadiyya.ca ahmadiyya.de pressahmadiyya.com whyahmadi.org Ahmadiyya Press @pressahmadiyya AhmadiyyaCanada @ahmadiyyacanada ahmadianswers.com @CynthiaDRitchie @theRealYLH #cyberbullies. Ahmadi Answers https://www.instagram.com/amatus23/ https://www.instagram.com/mahershalaali/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahershala_Ali @Ahmadianswers #RashidForVA https://www.eff.org/about/staff/shahid-buttar https://www.shahidforchange.us/ https://www.shahidbuttar.com/ https://twitter.com/Sheeyahshee rashidforva.com
Links and Related Essay’s
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Mosqueattack #trueislam
This entire entry was taken from here: https://www.jihadwatch.org/2019/10/the-ahmadis-the-jihad-against-free-speech.
“The Western leaders make me laugh by maintaining that they cannot put restrictions on newspapers and freedom of expression,” stated the Ahmadi “caliph,” Hadrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad, in London on February 10, 2006. This crackpot demonstrated how the small, caliphate-dreaming Ahmadi cult has joined other Muslims in demanding Islamic censorship — another fact that belies the Ahmadis’ fraudulently cultivated “moderate” reputation.
Ahmad spoke during a series of February-March 2006 London addresses following global Muslim outrage after the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in December 2005 published “foul caricatures” of Islam’s prophet Muhammad. Later compiled in an online book, the speeches documented how he found bewildering the defenses of the cartoons in Denmark and beyond as free speech, given Holocaust-denial prohibitions in Western countries like Denmark. The “vulgar expression about any sacred person of any religion does not constitute freedom in any way at all,” he stated.
In a March 29, 2008 London address contained in another online compendium of Ahmad’s statements, he reproached Western societies for “immoral acts” such as the Jyllands-Posten cartoons. These cartoons “ridicule founders of religions and prophets and make mockery of their teachings and scriptures.” Earlier in February, he had condemned the West for “swiftly abandoning religion” and said it was “demolishing moral values in every field in the name of freedom.” This “mischief is let loose that makes the filth of their minds and remoteness from God evident, and demonstrates their prejudice and malice against Islam.”
“Everything has a limit and some code of conduct,” including journalism, Ahmad concluded, as he called for suppressing such criticism of Islam, in line with similar calls from the Organization of the Islamic Conference, now known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). He approved the fact that the 57-member state (including “Palestine”) OIC, pursuant to a decades-long international censorship campaign, “has said that the Western countries will be pressured to apologize as well as to legislate against offending Prophets of God.” Given Muslim rioting worldwide in response to Denmark’s free speech, he presented himself as a protector of law and order, warning that if Islam’s critics “do not abstain, then world peace could not be guaranteed.” Similarly, a Danish Ahmadi wrote in a February 2006 edition of a local newspaper that the cartoons were “simply a dirty and childish act,” such that “to stem disorder it is required to apply” Denmark’s anti-defamation law.
Ahmad returned to his Islamic inquisition in 2012, following more international Muslim anger in response to the online American video Innocence of Muslims, as well as cartoons mocking Muhammad in France’s Charlie Hebdo satire magazine. Another online book collection of his speeches contained an introduction that condemned an “international conspiracy against Islam and its Holy Founder.” This involved “vulgar language, obscene descriptions, distortion of the teachings of Islam and the noble character of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” and “negative propaganda, blasphemous criticism.”
In a September 21, 2012 sermon in a Surrey, England, Ahmadi mosque, Ahmad once again subordinated critical discussion to Islamic law’s (sharia) blasphemy prohibitions. “Laws made by God are flawless. Do not consider, therefore, your man-made laws to be perfect,” he stated with unquestioning fidelity to Islamic orthodoxy. By contrast, the “law regarding freedom of speech is not a Divine scripture.”
Correspondingly, Ahmad called for legal action. “While a law for freedom of speech exists, neither in any country nor in the UN Charter do we find a law that states that no person will be allowed the freedom to hurt the religious sentiments of others or insult the holy personages of other religions.” “It is necessary for world peace that this is made a part of the UN peace charter,” otherwise there would result a “lava of hatred to erupt and the gulf between countries and religions to increasingly widen.”
During his first visit to the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, on December 3-4, 2012, he likewise advocated “policies that establish and protect mutual respect.” Thus “hurting the sentiments of others or causing them any type of harm should be outlawed.” This reflected that “Islam teaches that only those who use their tongues [emphasis added] and hands to spread injustice and hatred deserve to be punished.”
Ahmad in his Surrey address appealed to Muslims worldwide to support this legal campaign, as Muslims “could bring about a revolution in the world” with “laws pertaining to respecting religious sentiments within countries.” Governments in Muslim-majority countries should tell the “world that according to the teachings of the Holy Qur’an, playing with the religious sentiments of others or to try to dishonor the prophets of God is a major crime and major sin.” In tandem, “all of the Muslim lawyers of the world should join together and form a petition” advocating blasphemy punishments.
Global Muslim solidarity, while appealing to Ahmad in his Surrey remarks, had ominous implications for non-Muslims:
Muslims are the second greatest power of the world in terms of population and religion. Were they to abide by the commandments of Allah the Almighty they could become the greatest force in every sense. In such an instance, the anti-Islamic forces would never even dare contemplating or perpetrating such heart-rending acts.
Ahmad stressed that opposition to criticism of Islam should remain nonviolent, for “[i]t is completely contrary to the teachings of Islam to attack innocent people.” Earlier during his October 22, 2008 House of Commons address he had argued that “hatred spurs certain extremist Muslims into committing ‘un-Islamic’ deeds,” violence which serves as precisely his justification for censorship. “If our Muslim leaders had made robust efforts then the public would not react inappropriately, as is currently occurring in Pakistan and in other countries,” he stated in Surrey.
Yet contradictorily, Ahmad presented blasphemy’s effect upon Muslims in decidedly zealous, militant tones. A Muslim “is prepared to give up his or her life and be slain for the respect and honor of the Prophet.” Accordingly, Muslims “prostrate before God the Exalted and pray that may He take revenge from these wrongdoers. May they become a sign of admonishment that will remain a lesson until the end of time.”
Following their caliph, American Ahmadi leaders have promoted various stratagems to repress verbal attacks upon Islam, even in a land whose free speech protections are among the most robust in the world. Qasim Rashid has presented to this author and others the absurd legal analysis that long-overturned United States Supreme Court decisions (e.g. Schenk v. United States) could prohibit expression such as Terry Jones’ 2011 Quran burning. Like former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Harris Zafar, meanwhile, has attempted to shame Islam-critical “enemies of peace.” Zafar laments the fact that some people “claim that an individual’s privilege to say whatever they want is more important than the higher principle of uniting people.”
University of California-Los Angeles law professor Amjad Mahmood Khan also appeared to follow Clinton’s playbook during a 2015 address, while questionably asserting that Islamic doctrine favored free speech. “Differences of opinion are a blessing among my people,” the Ahmadi spokesman Khan cited Muhammad saying. When facing verbal attacks in seventh-century Arabia, he “bore this vile speech with patience and forbearance and he never sanctioned violence or prosecution for objectionable speech,” a claim that might surprise various dead poets in Islamic canons.
Nonetheless, the “Quran repeatedly discourages unseemly speech intended to sow discord,” Khan warned. Therefore
speech that is solely intended to ridicule the prophet and hurt the sentiments of over 1.5 billion Muslims must be exercised with caution and restraint. Of course the speech is unrestricted, not in the same way as it is in the Islamic world, here with our First Amendment, and as a lawyer I swear to protect those vital constitutional safeguards. But there still is a moral duty to condemn speech designed to hurt religious personages.
Past statements by Khan and other Ahmadi leaders undercut the liberal message of the February 26, 2016 launch at Washington, DC’s Rayburn House Office Building of the Ahmadi True Islam online public relations campaign. While addressing the audience, he lamented survey data showing American Muslim support for blasphemy restrictions. Contrasting with Rashid’s quoted online support for True Islam, Ahmadi representatives Amjad Chaudhry and Bashir Shams rejected before this author Rashid’s censorship views, with the latter saying “we believe in writing.”
Nevertheless, Ahmadi speech has often been merely another means of silencing critics such as the late (d. 2010) German scholar of Islam Hiltrud Schröter, author of a 2002 book on the Ahmadis. She discussed how the German Ahmadi community “attempted in various ways to silence me, for example through defamation and false assertions” online. According to these representations, she “worked unscientifically, is crazy, and has delusions.”
American anti-sharia activist Pamela Geller likewise condemned Ahmadi advocates in 2014. “These ‘moderate’ Muslims smear, defame and attack counter jihadists like Robert Spencer and me” and “provide essential cover for the global jihad,” she wrote, “so color me skeptical.” Ironically, “US leaders of the Ahmadi community carry water for the same Islamic supremacists who would cheerfully slit their throats if they were back in Pakistan.”
Yet the strained Ahmadi relationship with free speech makes sense given the Ahmadi faith’s hollowness. Strange and not-so-true Ahmadi beliefs previously examined in this series concerning matters including caliphates, Islamic history, Israel, Jesus, marriage, sex, and the West can no more withstand open debate than can the views of the late Lyndon LaRouche. While Ahmadis deserve the same sympathy as other victims of oppression in Muslim-majority societies worldwide, Ahmadis’ own antagonism towards liberty is just one more reason not to take the Ahmadis seriously.