

Towards the Definition of a Muslim in an Islamic State: The Case of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan

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The issue of the status of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan has been much publicized in recent years. This is due in large measure to the policies which the government of Pakistan applied to the Ahmadi community – first in 1974 when the Ahmadis were declared a "non-Muslim minority," and again in 1984, when further legal restrictions were placed upon the community. Such actions by Pakistan's government have been decried in the western press as constituting a denial of religious freedom, and international organizations have voiced numerous concerns over human rights violations implicit in the government's policies.

This paper attempts to present a political analysis of the Ahmadi issue in Pakistan. This is a difficult task; complicated by the chronically partisan nature of the issue and its "political sensitivity" in Pakistan. The paper is divided into four parts. The first traces the philosophical foundations of the Ahmadiyya through a brief account of the career of Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement. The second details the development of the Ahmadi philosophy and its interaction with Indian nationalist politics. The third section traces the role of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistani politics, and the final section provides some thoughts on the "policy logic" of Pakistan's decision-makers relevant to the Ahmadi issue.

Life and Teachings of Ghulam Ahmad

Very little concerning the lifetime of Ghulam Ahmad is certain. It is generally acknowledged that he was born in 1835, and it is indis-

putable that he was born in Qadian, a village located in present-day Indian Punjab.¹ Ahmadi historians stress the nobility of Ghulam's ancestors. They claim that he was a direct descendant of Haji Barlas, the uncle of Amir Timur; and that one of Ghulam's ancestors, Hadi Beg, came to India from Samarkhand with Babar, the first Mughal emperor of India.² Regardless of the authenticity of such claims, Ghulam's paternal grandfather was Mirza 'Ata Muhammad. 'Ata Muhammad was a wealthy *jagir*-holding landlord, his holdings including the area of present-day Qadian and its environs. In 1800, he lost most of his land to invading Sikhs, and in 1802, he was forced to abandon his ancestral homestead in Qadian.³ Mirza Ghulam Mur-taza, Ghulam's father, witnessed the demise of his family's fortune, and perhaps as a consequence, became obsessed with the concern to regain title to the lost lands. Ghulam Mur-taza's efforts were partially successful – in 1835 he managed to have title to five villages restored.⁴

Accounts of the early years of Ghulam Ahmad's life are fraught with unresolved issues. Ahmadi historians stress the intelligence and piety of the young Ghulam. Non-Ahmadi historians stress the latter's supposed effeminacy and chronicle the grotesque consequences of his alleged sickly constitution.⁵ In any case, Ghulam's first instruction was handled by private tutors. He was a reasonably good student in Islamic exegesis, and during these years he learned Arabic. Between 1858 and 1864 (depending upon source), and at the prompting of his father, Ghulam entered the Law Court at Sialkot as a clerk. But Ghulam was not destined to become a lawyer. He failed his examinations, and according to Ahmadi historians, he also failed to become fluent in English.⁶ In 1868, Ghulam returned to Qadian to continue his Islamic studies and to help with the management of his family's estate.

The period from 1876 to 1877 marks a turning point in the career of Ghulam. In 1876 his father died; in 1877, Ghulam Qadir, Ghulam's older brother, assumed full responsibilities for the management of the family's estate, freeing Ghulam to continue his religious studies. Moreover, in 1877, Ghulam had his first prophetic vision. In this vision Ghulam foresaw the death of his father and was consoled by the promise of his future destiny as a prophet.⁷ During the next twenty years the major tenets of the Ahmadiyya were formulated.

Methodology: Jihad of the Word

A fundamental tenet of the Ahmadiyya (and Islam) is the concept of *jihad* (just war). As interpreted by Ghulam Ahmad, the propagation of Islam is a duty of every Muslim but such propagation should rarely be expressed violently. Rather, propagation should occur in the realm of reasoned discourse; and its champions not warriors but skilled debaters.

There is not the least truth in the assertion that it is time for resorting to the sword and gun for spreading the true religion and righteousness. The sword, far from revealing the beauties and excellences of truth, makes them dubious and throws them into the background. Those who hold such views are not the friends of Islam but its deadly foes. They have low motives, mean natures, poor spirits, narrow minds, dull brains, and short sight. . . . The religion that can easily establish its truth and superiority by sound intellectual arguments, heavenly signs or other reliable testimony, does not need the sword to threaten men and force a confession of its truth from them. Religion is worth the name only as long as it is in consonance with reason. If it fails to satisfy that requisite; if it has to make up for its discomfiture in argument by handling the sword, it needs no other argument for its falsification. The sword it wields cuts its own throat before reaching others.⁸

Important is Ghulam Ahmad's application of this doctrine to the British raj. Ghulam argued that any declaration of forceful *jihad* against the British was unwarranted. Wars in Islam, he argued, can be classed into three categories: (1) defensive wars – "war by way of self-protection"; (2) punitive wars – "blood for blood"; and (3) freedom struggles – "with a view to break the power of those who kill those who accept Islam."⁹ Islam accords religious justification only for wars of the third type. By this interpretation war against British rule could not be justified. Patently, the intention of the British was to politically dominate India, not to destroy nor forcibly convert its Muslim inhabitants.¹⁰

Nevertheless, Ghulam Ahmad never abandoned his notion of peaceful *jihad*. In fact, the history of the Ahmadiis can be described as a chronicle of contentious disputes with various groups that have

taken issue with Ahmadi doctrine. Typically, Ahmadis have entered these disputes with the same religious intensity that characterizes the forceful application of *jihad*. In this sense the peaceful *jihad* of the word can be viewed as the methodological foundation of the Ahmadi movement; it is impossible to separate the content of Ahmadi philosophy from its manner of propagation.

One major technique of *jihad* of the word were debates or "prayer duels." An example is provided by describing a famous Christian-Ahmadi debate termed by one Ahmadi historian as the "Jihad of 1893."¹¹ In 1892, the Christian mission at Jandilya (located in present-day Indian Punjab), headed by Dr. Martin Clarke, "challenged" the Muslims of the area to a debate on the truth of their respective religions. The Jandilya Muslims called upon Ghulam Ahmad to represent their position in the debate.¹² The Christians were represented by Dr. Abdullah A'thim. The rules governing the debate were that:

1. The venue of the debate was to be Amritsar, at the home of Dr. Clarke.
2. One hundred tickets were issued to Christian and Muslim visitors (fifty to each side).
3. The debate was to be held for five hours a day for two weeks.¹³

During the course of the debate Ghulam Ahmad explained his claim that "every religion should prove its truth with living signs" and questioned his opponent about the divinity of Jesus.¹⁴ In response A'thim challenged: (1) the Islamic conception of God's mercy; (2) divine determination as believed by Muslims; (3) the use of force for the propagation of Islam; (4) the truth of the Quran as revealed truth; and (5) the prophethood of Muhammad.¹⁵ The quality of the debate is unknown, although Ahmadi historians stress the allegedly trite and weak arguments advanced by Ghulam's adversary. In any case, the debate became increasingly acrimonious, and finally on the last day Ghulam Ahmad dropped a bombshell on the assemblage:

I have been fervently praying to God to decide between the two parties. We, humble servants of His, could do nothing without His help. So he gave me last night the glad tidings that "of the two parties whichever is deliberately supporting falsehood, and is forsaking the One True God and regards an humble human

as the God Almighty, shall be thrown into Hell within fifteen months from today unless he turns to the truth. And the one who follows the right path and believes in One True God, shall be honoured."¹⁶

Soon, this "prophecy" became the talk of the Punjab. Dr. Martin Clarke stated that it was impossible to fully comprehend the effect that the prophecy had on the minds of the public: "It is a plain, clear issue; it is no longer a war of words, or a drawing of distinctions – a sign from heaven is to be vouchsafed."¹⁷ To make a long story short, the expiration of the fifteen-month period found Dr. A'thim in good health. This fact occasioned great excitement within the Christian community. But both sides claimed that they had been vindicated by God – Christians because A'thim lived; Ahmadis because the prophecy had caused A'thim to turn from his evil ways.

The instant effect of this prophecy upon Dr. Abdullah A'thim the leader of the Christians, was that his face turned pale and he began to tremble. Placing his hands upon his ears he publicly declared that he was never insolent to the Prophet of Arabia and that he did not use the word "anti-Christ" for him.¹⁸

The adoption of a methodology that calls for the propagation of faith by a war of words may easily succumb to the danger of escalation into less non-violent forms. Indeed, Ghulam Ahmad's methodological style often left him on the razor's edge of physical violence with his opponents. Two examples deserve note. The first concerns the attempted murder of Dr. Martin Clarke and subsequent trial of Ghulam Ahmad in 1896. Abdul Hamid, the alleged assailant, claimed that Ghulam Ahmad had hired him to kill Dr. Clarke because of the latter's involvement in the debate of 1893. Ghulam Ahmad denied complicity in the assassination attempt. The prosecution's case was weak, and it was not helped when Abdul Hamid recanted his earlier testimony during the proceedings. Much to the joy of the Ahmadi community, which had drawn parallels between this trial and the trial of Jesus, the case against Ghulam Ahmad was eventually dismissed.¹⁹

The case of Lekh Ram's murder is also cited by anti-Ahmadi polemicists as constituting proof of Ghulam Ahmad's complicity in

criminal activities. Lekh Ram was a prominent member of the Arya Samaj. In this role he often verbally sparred with Ghulam Ahmad. For instance in 1885, Lekh Ram was invited to Qadian so that he could see some "heavenly signs." As a precondition for his acceptance of the invitation he demanded that Ghulam Ahmad deposit Rs. 2,400 into a bank account. If the heavenly signs were not produced such funds would be forfeited. Ghulam Ahmad answered in kind, demanding that Lekh Ram "ante up" an equal amount.²⁰ Subsequent to this confrontation of words, Ghulam Ahmad made public a revelation that he had received some years previously: "A calf, a lifeless body that makes a lowing sound. He is destined to meet with a dire punishment."²¹ The revelation also disclosed that within six years (of 1893) the prophecy would be fulfilled. The "calf" was now interpreted by Ghulam Ahmad to be none other than Lekh Ram. Lekh Ram countered Ghulam's prophecy with a prediction to the effect that Ghulam Ahmad would die within three years. Both prophecies were widely publicised. In 1897, Lekh Ram was murdered; the assassin was never found. Ahmadis cite this as an instance of the truth of Ghulam Ahmad's prophecies; opponents argue that Ghulam Ahmad had a hand in its fruition.

The Death of Jesus

In 1891, Ghulam Ahmad made his first statements concerning the death of Jesus. His observations met with such disfavour both among Christians and Muslims that he devoted the best part of a decade in their defence. Such efforts culminated in 1899 with the publication of *Jesus in India*.

In this book Ghulam Ahmad "refutes" some "misconceptions," both of Muslims and Christians, concerning the phenomenon of Jesus. He contends that Christians and Muslims agree that Jesus is alive in the heavens, but that they differ with regard to the literalness of the resurrection, and as to the form the Messiah will take in his return to earthly existence. Muslims believe that Jesus did not suffer the ordeal of the Cross, but that he was removed and transported to heaven by angels; Christians believe in Jesus' mastery of death.²² And, although both religions believe in a second coming of Jesus, Muslims stress the "bloody" aspects of the *mahdi*, as opposed to the Christian concept of a gentle, just Messiah.²³

Ghulam Ahmad replaces such theories with his own interpretation of the Bible and the Quran. Jesus *did* undergo torture on the Cross. However, due to a number of factors (Pontius Pilate's conspiracy to spare Jesus, the most salient), Jesus survived the ordeal. Jesus fell into a state of coma, which was mistaken for death and he was placed in the sepulchre. After two days Jesus came to his senses and left the tomb. The wounds on his hands and feet were cured by a remarkably therapeutic ointment -- *marham-i-Isa* (Jesus' ointment).²⁴ As a consequence Jesus was able to travel, and with a small retinue he went east in search of the lost tribes of the Israelites. Eventually this quest took him all the way to Kashmir, where he found the "descendants" of the Israelites, the Pathans. After a long life devoted to religious activity in India, Jesus died at the ripe old age of 120 near Srinagar.

Of course, this doctrine presents a mythical, if not fantastic account of Jesus' life; and the evidence which Ghulam Ahmad advances to support his theory is dubious at best. But more important than documentation are the implications such a doctrine had on the corpus of Ahmadi beliefs. The fact that Jesus is dead implies that the *mahdi* will not be Jesus. In fact, the *mahdi* could appear at any time and at any place. In 1901, Ghulam Ahmad explicitly claimed what his doctrine of Jesus had merely implied, namely, that he (Ghulam Ahmad) was the promised Messiah, the *mahdi*.²⁵

Khatm-i-Nabuwat

Central to all Muslims is the belief in *khatm-i-nabuwat* (the finality of the Holy Prophet), as expressed in the tenet: "Allah is the One God and Muhammad is His Messenger." Crucial, therefore, to the historical development of the Ahmadiyya (and to the interaction of the Ahmadiyya with Muslim groups) is the determination of the question of whether Ghulam Ahmad's teachings violated this central tenet of Islam.

The answer to this question, however, is fraught with ambiguity. At times Ghulam Ahmad equated his status with that of the Holy Prophet. For instance:

This is the secret of the words spoken by the Holy Prophet: "Whoever has seen me has seen God." This is the final stage

in the spiritual progress of man, the goal where all his labours end, and rest and satisfaction are granted to the pilgrim.

I shall be guilty of a great injustice if I hide the fact that I have been raised to this spiritual eminence. Almighty God has favoured me with his certain word and chosen me that I may give sight to the blind, lead the seekers to the object of their search and give to the acceptors of truth the glad tidings of the pure fountain which is talked of among many but is found by very few.²⁶

At other times Ghulam Ahmad reiterated a more traditional interpretation of *khatm-i-nabuwat*:

And for us there is no Prophet other than Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets. Be ye witnesses that we hold the Quran, the Book of Allah, the source of Truth and Knowledge and accept what was established by consensus during that period. We add nothing to it and detract naught and shall live with and die by it.²⁷

The most complete expression of Ghulam Ahmad's doctrine of *khatm-i-nabuwat* is found in *The Will of the Promised Messiah*. Also within this document is found the first expression of the concept of "reflector prophethood":

But its (Islam's) perfect follower cannot be called an independent prophet for this is a disrespect towards the prophethood of Muhammad. He can, however, be called a prophet and follower simultaneously, for such designation does not involve any disrespect towards the perfect prophethood of Muhammad, but it is indicative of the lustre of His blessings. . . . Almighty God has so ordained that the gift of a pure, holy and divine revelation is granted to such of the followers of the Holy Prophet who attain the highest stage of a complete annihilation in the Prophet; and the veil which keeps Him hidden from strangers is entirely removed. Thus the condition of being a true follower of the Holy Prophet is fulfilled in them in a most perfect sense, for their own personality vanishes away, and the image of the personality of the Holy Prophet appears in the looking-glass of the absorp-

tion. On the other hand, they are granted a most perfect gift of Divine revelation like the Prophets of God and thus deserve to be called Prophets.²⁸

Although this formulation is more systematic than earlier expressions of the doctrine, it still leaves a number of questions unanswered. Namely, what is the status of "prophets" who came before the Holy Prophet? Only in an allegorical sense can they be termed followers of the Holy Prophet. Are such prophets, therefore, independent? If the answer is "yes," it leads to the question whether there can be an independent prophet after Muhammad who is not his follower or alternatively to questions of gradations of prophetic consciousness. Ghulam Ahmad left the answers to such questions unresolved during his lifetime.

Development and Growth, 1908-1934

By the time of Ghulam Ahmad's death in 1908, the leadership of the Ahmadi community had become diverse and increasingly prosperous and well-educated. Two extraordinary men among Ghulam Ahmad's followers were Muhammad Ali of Lahore, the first editor of the *Review of Religions* (a scholarly Ahmadi journal), and Khwaja Kamaluddin, an attorney from Peshawar. Both men attempted to present the teachings of Ghulam Ahmad in a liberal, rational manner. During the period of Muhammad Ali's editorship of the *Review*, 1908-1914, Ali stressed Ghulam Ahmad's role as a reformer for all religions. Ghulam Ahmad's mission, he claimed, was to reassert the vitality of the old forms of religious expression, not to create a new religion. In this vein he emphasized the doctrine of non-violence advocated by Ghulam Ahmad's peaceful *jihad*. Further, Ali argued that Ghulam Ahmad's prophetic vision in no way challenged *khatm-i-nabuwat*, Ghulam was but a reflector-prophet.²⁹

Similarly, Kamaluddin worked for a rapprochement with other religious groups by organizing conferences of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and Parsis. In one such conference in 1911, Kamaluddin stated that the Ahmadiyya did not differ from other Islamic sects in any cardinal principle. The only difference was that the Ahmadiyya had accepted Ghulam Ahmad as the fulfilment of Muhammad's prophecy concerning the appearance of a returned Messiah.³⁰

It must be stressed that this "school" of thought never claimed allegiance from more than a small minority of the Ahmadi faithful. The overwhelming majority continued to advocate the traditional view that Ghulam Ahmad was more than a reflector-prophet. As the schism widened within the Ahmadiyya the liberal school received the appellation "Lahori"; the traditional school the name "Qadiani."

After Ghulam Ahmad's death the leadership of the Ahmadis ("khalifat") passed to Maulwi Nuruddin. Nuruddin had taken *ba'it* (oath of allegiance) in the first such Ahmadi ceremony in 1889. Despite the claims of anti-Ahmadi polemicists that posit Nuruddin as the motive force behind Ghulam Ahmad's meteoric success,³¹ he palpably lacked the dynamism and charisma of the founder. During his tenure he was unable to bridge the widening gap between the branches of the Ahmadiyya. Indeed in 1911, according to Lavan, Mahmud Ahmad, son of Ghulam Ahmad and heir-apparent to the *khalifat*, published an article declaring all non-Ahmadis *kafirs* (unbelievers),³² thus further alienating the Lahoris from the Qadianis. Indeed, this declaration became a factor in the Lahori rejection of Mahmud Ahmad's later bid to become *khalif* and led to their more general criticism of the Qadiani definition of the *khalifat*.

Ostensibly the battle over the meaning of an Ahmadi *khalifat* was fought within the parameters of two contradictory interpretations of *The Will of the Promised Messiah*. The Lahoris argued that the *Sadr Anjuman* (trustees of the *khalif*) had the ultimate authority in deciding issues that affected the community. Among such rights was the power to divest a *khalif* of his office. The Qadiani branch also referred to *The Will* to bolster their claims that the *khalif*, once elected, was placed beyond the confines of temporal authority. Ghulam Ahmad never definitively addressed this issue; *The Will* left wide latitude for later interpretation. *The Will* calls for the formation of the *Sadr Anjuman*, but Ghulam Ahmad appointed Nuruddin as his successor. Therefore, the most realistic way to view the *khalifat* controversy is as a struggle for political control of the Ahmadiyya. The outcome of the struggle proved to be a victory for the Qadiani branch, through the election in 1914 of Mahmud Ahmad as the second *khalif*.

Mahmud Ahmad's Khalifat

The immediate result of the defeat of the Lahoris was the formal es-

tablishment of an Ahmadi *khalifat*. As interpreted by the Qadianis, the *khalifat* is a divine office and a *khalif* is appointed by God, and is directed by, and is a result of, the "divine will." A person cannot be elected as *khalif* without divine blessings; the use of the human agency of election then, is but a reflection of the divine agency. Therefore, a man cannot become *khalif* through his own efforts, or through the assumption of the office through inheritance.³³ Further, the *khalif* once elected cannot be divested of his office. In rejecting the recommendations of the Ahmadi Administrative Enquiry Committee (1930), that called for a "Body of Trustees" to be recognized as the custodian and proprietor of all properties of the Ahmadiyya, Mahmud Ahmad countered:

. . . *Khilafat* is a favour of God, the Supreme, and it stays as long as the community is worthy of it. And when the community becomes unworthy of it, it fades away. As long as the community will remain worthy of it this blessing will remain with them. If anybody has the idea that the Consultative Conference is representative of the community and the Board of Trustees should become its representative, he should bear in mind that we are not even prepared to have such a thing and are prepared to make every sacrifice to fight it out but we are not prepared to hurt the *khilafat* institution. Allah is our witness. I say it openly. Such people should part company with us and the sooner the better . . . but I will never like anyone to stay with us with the basic differences in respect to the *khalifat*. This is a matter of principle and nobody holding contrary views can remain with us.³⁴

Mahmud Ahmad was a talented organizer and propagandist. Although his long tenure (1914-1965) did not usher in any radical break with the philosophical bases of the Ahmadi tradition, it did serve to codify and formalize its doctrine. His term of office was also characterized by active and highly successful missionary activity. In the pursuit of this latter objective it could be said that Mahmud Ahmad carried his father's doctrine of *jihad* of the word to its logical extreme. Two examples bear note.

In 1923, Mahmud Ahmad launched "operation reclaim." Its purpose was to reconvert former Muslims, who had converted to Hinduism in Uttar Pradesh. To the Ahmadis the attempt partook of all

of the elements of an epic struggle between Hinduism and Islam. Mahmud Ahmad organized an "expeditionary force" of thirty volunteer missionaries (forty-four others later participated), and provided Rs. 50,000 for the venture. One participant described the operation as: "a great war being fought on a 100-mile front with the forces of Hinduism and Islam locked in a life or death struggle."³⁵ Ahmadi accounts of the event claim that the Ahmadis met with a great deal of success in the operation.³⁶ Indeed, the operation must have borne some fruit because it occasioned several incidents of physical violence between the Ahmadi missionaries and local non-Ahmadi Muslims, who thought the former were gaining too large a foothold on the population.

A second example of Mahmud Ahmad's *jihad* concerns prophetic visions that he became aware of prior to his trip to England in 1926. The first vision involved Lloyd George.

The promised Messiah or one of his *khalifs* had a vision of himself addressing an audience in London. Suddenly at the same time Lloyd George's face underwent a change and in great consternation he said that he had just heard word that the forces of Mirza Mahmud Ahmad were bearing down on the Christian army that was in retreat.³⁷

Another vision saw Mahmud Ahmad standing on the coast of England, dressed in military attire in the rank of general. In this vision Mahmud Ahmad had the impression that he had just fought and won a victory and was now deliberating on how to consolidate his gains. Then he heard a voice intoning: "William the Conqueror."³⁸

Mahmud Ahmad propagated an expansive concept of the "Promised Messiah's" role as *mahdi* and prophet. He argued that Ghulam Ahmad was the prophet for all religions: "He [Ghulam Ahmad] claimed to be the Messiah for the Christians, the *mahdi* for the Muslims, Krishna for the Hindus, and Mesio Darbahmi for the Zoroastrians."³⁹ The purpose of Ghulam Ahmad's message then, was interpreted as not restricted to the reformation of Islam, but rather was designed to collect all mankind "under the banner of one faith." Also, Mahmud Ahmad formalized a doctrine of types of prophethood, delineating two types of prophets according to a continuum of law-bearing status. The first group, the law-bearers, include Moses and Muhammad. The second group, "restorers and

re-establishers of the law after man has forsaken it," include in their ranks Elijah, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Jesus, and Ghulam Ahmad. Accordingly, Ghulam Ahmad's prophethood did not challenge Muhammad's prophethood because the former merely reinterpreted the law as pronounced by Muhammad and did not create anything new himself.⁴⁰ Therefore, Mahmud Ahmad contended that the Ahmadiyya were not a sect of Islam but rather that "Ahmadiyyat and Islam are one and the same thing."⁴¹

The most important modification of Ahmadi doctrine undertaken during the long tenure of Mahmud Ahmad was not textual, however, rather it was strategic. Ghulam Ahmad had preached a political quiescence which had called upon his followers to disassociate themselves from attempts to overthrow the British by means of force. Ghulam Ahmad perceived that independence was not an immediate, nor foreseeable prospect in the subcontinent. Accordingly, he took the position that the most appropriate political strategy that the Ahmadiyya could employ was to consolidate and improve their relative position among the British subjects. The political environment had changed dramatically by the time of Mahmud Ahmad's *khalifat*. Independence was no longer a remote possibility, rather it seemed inevitable. Accordingly, the political strategy of the Ahmadis underwent modification.

The fundamental position advocated by Mahmud Ahmad was that India needed reform, but that because of sectarian differences (and particularly religious persecution), independence should be delayed. This position was taken because Ahmadis feared persecution by an unchecked Muslim and/or Hindu majority. Mahmud Ahmad was also sensitive, however, to the criticism that the Ahmadiyya were perceived as too supportive of British rule. Consequently, he called for significant concessions from the British including: the abolition of racial discrimination; the trial of British nationals charged with crimes by a jury composed of Indians; and the nationalization of major economic concerns.⁴² On the other hand, the Ahmadiyya also presented numerous petitions to the government calling for a postponement of independence until the status of the rights of minority communities was settled. For instance, Mahmud Ahmad presented the Simon Commission with a number of demands: (1) that no electoral arrangement would be acceptable that would hurt the interests of minority populations; (2) that important concessions should be given weightage in representative bodies,

so that their interests could be safeguarded; (3) that the propagation of faith should never be placed under any restriction at any time; (4) that no community should be able to restrict or curb the freedom of any other community; and (5) that Urdu should be recognized as the official language of several provinces.⁴³

Relevant to these demands, Mahmud Ahmad was particularly wary of the designs of Hindus who, he argued, would attack and destroy Islam in an undivided India.⁴⁴ Consequently he rejected the recommendations of the *Nehru Report*. He claimed that the *Report* took away the existing rights of Muslims; refused to accede to demands of minorities; rejected the joint electorate; did not comprehend the language issue; proposed a unitary central government which would overlook the needs of minority regions; disposed of the demand for religious and economic freedom in a "maze of verbiage"; and skirted the issue of safeguards for the interests of minorities.⁴⁵ Further, Mahmud Ahmad disavowed the stratagem of civil disobedience against the British. As his father had argued forty years earlier, he took a restrictive view of the applicability of violent *jihād*. "Permission to go to war is accorded only to those who have been victims of tyranny and aggression, and this permission has been accorded because God wishes to demonstrate His power to help the oppressed against their oppressors."⁴⁶ By ruling India for two hundred years the British had established their standing as a lawfully constituted government. Therefore, the use of civil disobedience, a form of coercion, against them was invalid. Further, civil disobedience is inappropriate. "Freedom is a nice thing, but the way to achieve it leading to perpetual bondage is not good. The Congress has taken a way to attain freedom that would land India in perpetual slavery and that way is the way of civil disobedience."⁴⁷

The Ahmadiyya in Politics, 1934-1988

The Disturbances of 1934 and 1953

Despite such intentions, the distance the Ahmadiyya had kept from the nationalist struggle was narrowed during 1928-1934 as the community became enmeshed in Kashmiri politics. As discussed above, Kashmir played a prominent role in the theology of the Ahmadis. In *Jesus in India* Ghulam Ahmad had claimed that Jesus had died in Kashmir and was buried in Srinagar. Accordingly, Khan Yar Street,

the reputed site of the tomb, had become a revered site to Ahmadi faithful. Further, the Ahmadis under the *khilafat* of Mahmud Ahmad had established one of their largest missionary centres in Kashmir. Therefore, Ahmadis were outraged by the mounting evidence of oppression of Muslims in Kashmir at the hands of Hari Singh.

As a result several prominent Ahmadis became members of the All-India Kashmir Conference which was convened in 1929. In fact, the first chairman of the Conference was Mahmud Ahmad. A brief respite in Muslim-Ahmadi hostilities was enjoyed during this period, due in large measure to the perception of a common enemy. The Conference unanimously rejected the British solution to the problem (i.e. the appointment of Hari Kishan Kaul as the Prime Minister) and instead continued to support the claims of the now-imprisoned Sheikh Abdullah. Further, to press its demands the Conference called for a complete *hartal* (closure) to be held on August 14, dubbed "Kashmir Day."

However, Muslim-Ahmadi unity proved short-lived. Indeed, the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam-Hind (the Ahrar), a Deobandi Sunni association virulently opposed to the Ahmadiyya, emerged as a potent force in 1931. Accordingly, the Ahrar opposed Sheikh Abdullah because of his alleged sympathy with the Ahmadis (Jalaluddin, Abdullah's closest advisor, was Khwaja Kamaluddin's brother), and deliberately worked to diminish the influence of the Ahmadiyya in Kashmir. Also, they pre-empted Kashmir Day by sending a large contingent of Ahrar supporters across the border to effect "direct action" (i.e. to break up the Ahmadi *hartal*).

Although the details of the Kashmir issue are beyond the scope of this paper,⁴⁸ it is important to note that one outcome of the anti-Ahmadi campaign was that the Ahmadiyya were forced from the forefront of Kashmir politics. In 1932, Mahmud Ahmad, succumbing to pressure from the British, was forced to resign his chairmanship of the All-India Kashmir Conference. A year later a new committee was formed which was bereft of Ahmadi membership. This latter committee was chaired by Muhammad Iqbal. Also, the raj began to perceive Ahmadis as inimical to British interests. For instance in 1933, the British deported two prominent Ahmadis, Zain-ul-Abidin and Bashir Ahmad, from Kashmir. And in 1934, an internal administrative memo prohibited further meetings between British officials and Ahmadis.

Throughout the early 1930s the religious and political doctrines of the Ahmadiyya were attacked with unprecedented ferocity. An example is Muhammad Iqbal's tract *Islam and Ahmadism*. Its thesis is simple. Ahmadis are practising a "major heresy" because their doctrine contradicts the Finality of the Prophethood. This doctrine in "the socio-political organization of Islam is perfect and eternal. No revelation the denial of which entails heresy is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor to Islam."⁴⁹ Further, Iqbal challenged Ghulam Ahmad's claim of "likeness" to Muhammad. First, if likeness is viewed as spiritual likeness, it follows that the two prophethoods are different because not identical. If the argument means reincarnation the "argument is plausible; but its author turns out to only be a Magian in disguise."⁵⁰ Most important though, Iqbal opposed the Ahmadiyya because he saw in the movement a "retreat" to what he considered "authority-based knowledge," rather than "reason-based knowledge." To Iqbal the Ahmadiyya posed a threat to the whole structure of rational, empirically based philosophy and science.⁵¹

While Iqbal was attacking the philosophic bases of the Ahmadiyya the Ahrar was confronting the movement with a stolid physical presence. The Ahrars provoked the showdown in 1934 by staging a conference to be held in Qadian. The Punjab government authorities prevented the Ahrar from holding their conference within city limits, but they did allow them to hold demonstrations adjacent to the city. At the conference the Ahrars "discussed" the following:

1. The Ahmadiyya religion and the claim of the present head and his predecessors to be prophets.
2. The alleged attempts of Ahmadis to establish a position of religious and temporal independence at Qadian under the protection of the government.
3. The position of Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan as a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council.
4. The rationale for declaring the Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority.
5. The legitimacy of all Muslim associations which had allowed Ahmadis to be members and office bearers.⁵²

Nearly 10,000 attended the conference but despite the potentially explosive situation very little actual physical violence occurred. However, enmity between the Ahrar and the Ahmadis was heightened by the conference. A war of pamphlets continued with only brief interludes up to the time of World War II, and the bitterness engendered by the conference formed the bedrock of hatred for the more serious disturbances of 1953-54.

The definitive word on these latter disturbances (the so-called "Punjab disturbances") was the Punjab government's report authored by Justice Muhammad Munir.⁵³ First, the *Munir Report* concluded that the primary cause of the disturbances was the Ahrar and other like-minded groups of *ulema*. Incendiary statements by leaders of these groups had prompted most of the violence. The situation became uncontrollable because of administrative incompetence and collusion, which allowed the agitators to go unpunished, and which supported an irresponsible press. The Ahmadis were found to be the victims of the anti-Ahmadi agitation and had done little to provoke the clash. Second, the incidents of violence were precipitated by the rejection of the Muslim groups' anti-Ahmadi demands by the government, and the consequent direct action of these Muslim groups. The rejected demands were quite similar to those made twenty years earlier by the Ahrar at Qadian:

1. that the Ahmadi be declared a minority;
2. that Chaudhuri Zafrullah Khan be removed from office;
3. that other Ahmadis be removed from key posts in the state.⁵⁴

One legacy of the findings of the *Munir Report* served to weaken the power of the *ulema* in Pakistan. Soon after the publication of the *Report* opposition to the adoption of a "secular constitution" (heretofore spearheaded by the *ulema*) evaporated. Also, two prominent *alim* – Maulana Maududi⁵⁵ and Maulana Niazi⁵⁶ were imprisoned for their participation in the anti-Ahmadi agitation. Perhaps the imposition of the prison sentences (both were given life sentences; later commuted to two years) demonstrated a reaction that condemned not only lawlessness but all religious agitation. Despite such government actions, the issue of the status of the Ahmadis had not been sufficiently answered. The Ahmadis continued to be considered Muslims, but more because of the excesses of their opponents, than because they had adequately convinced the

public, let alone the offended religious community, of their orthodoxy.

When one views the Punjab disturbances in the light of the overall development of the Ahmadiyya, one is struck by a certain discontinuity in the style of Ahmadi polemic. Namely, why were the Ahmadis quiescent in the face of the attacks upon the very bases of their existence? The disturbances did not occasion a single prayer-duel nor a prophecy of an opponent's imminent demise. The Ahmadis remained curiously passive throughout. Possibly the plunge of the Ahmadiyya into the waters of institutionalized political struggle had dampened the zeal of their religious dogma. Indeed, this passivity continues to the present day and is demonstrated most tellingly in the directions the Ahmadi philosophy has taken during the last three decades.

The Philosophical Rapprochement

The most significant modification which the Ahmadi philosophy has undergone in recent years concerns the reinterpretation of the *khatm-i-nabuwat*. As may be recalled, Mahmud Ahmad formalized the Ahmadi version of the doctrine around the criterion of law-bearing status. Accordingly, he distinguished two types of prophets: those who pronounce new law and those who merely reinterpret existing law. The reinterpretation of *khatm-i-nabuwat* keeps this distinction, but subdivides the non-law bearing category into two parts. The result is three categories of prophethood:

1. *Real Prophethood*. A law-bearing prophethood that reveals a new code like that of Moses or Muhammad.
2. *Independent Prophethood*. This is a non-law bearing prophethood which carries no new law but is independent and a "direct divine gift"; allegiance to a former prophet not being a condition precedent to its grant. Prophets who fall into this category include David and Jesus, both because they served the Mosaic Law but did not "owe the favour to Moses," having been graced directly by their personal merit.
3. *Reflector or Reflex Prophethood*. This is "attained through allegiance to a former prophet, by seeking light from him and becoming a reflex-action manifestation of his excellences." A prophet of this type is simultaneously a prophet and a fol-

lower. The prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad fell within this category.⁵⁷

The modified position of the Ahmadiyya with regard to *khatm-i-nabuwat* follows directly from this subdivision of the types of prophethood. Simply, the door to both independent and real prophethood is forever closed subsequent to the appearance of Muhammad. The door to reflex-prophethood or discipleship, however, is left open. "Finality" in the sense that the term is used in the Quran refers to the perfect manifestation of an object, that is, its final form. Therefore, in no way can Ghulam Ahmad's claim be seen as constituting a threat to *khatm-i-nabuwat*.⁵⁸

Obviously, this reinterpretation constitutes a severe contraction of the perceived scope of Ghulam Ahmad's prophetic consciousness. No longer is Ghulam Ahmad perceived as someone *like* Jesus. Indeed, Ghulam Ahmad's prophethood is qualitatively inferior to Jesus' and further no one, after the appearance of Muhammad, can pretend to ascend to a status commensurate with Jesus. Therefore, the traditional position of Ahmadis regarding Ghulam Ahmad's status as *mahdi* is overturned. Ghulam Ahmad is a *mujjahid* (a renewer of the faith), not a prophet.

One explanation for this doctrinal change is associated with renewed demands to declare the Ahmadi a non-Muslim minority. The findings of the *Munir Report*, although weakening the power of the *ulema*, had left unresolved the issue of the rightful status of the Ahmadiyya. Therefore, as the immediacy of the Punjab disturbances faded, and as the governmental restrictions banning discussion of the Ahmadi issue were relaxed, the demands of the *ulema* once again became strident. Simultaneously, the Ahmadi movement was undergoing a period of transition. The Ahmadiyya had become a worldwide organization; their ranks had swollen in a period of sixty years from forty faithful (the original number taking *ba'it* in 1889) to "several million" by the early 1970s. The Ahmadiyya was no longer fighting for its everyday survival, rather it had become an established and vibrant organization. In the light of these changed circumstances the main strategy of the Ahmadiyya (1954-1974) had as its goal the consolidation of these gains. The first step towards this goal was conceived as the final resolution of the issue of Ahmadi-Muslim identity. Consequently the Ahmadi movement attempted a philosophical rapprochement with other Muslim groups. Simply, if the differences

between Ahmadis and Muslims could be demonstrated to be minor then, the Ahmadis could not be considered non-Muslims.⁵⁹

Of course, in the light of the Rabwah incident and subsequent events this strategy failed. The Ahmadiyya despite their protestations were officially classified as a "non-Muslim minority."

The Rabwah Incident

The so-called Rabwah incident consisted of two acts. The first occurred on May 22, 1974 at Rabwah railway station. A group of some two hundred students from Nishtar Medical College, Multan, were on an outing to Peshawar. During the course of the journey the train stopped at Rabwah. While standing on the platform a number of the medical students raised "some slogans and placards" that were offensive to the Ahmadis. A week later on the return trip to Multan, the medical students were met by some four to five hundred Ahmadi students, who swarmed the train with "hockey sticks, *lathis*, and stones." The medical students were routed and nineteen were hospitalized, although no one was seriously hurt in the fracas. The second "act" was more tragic. Violence spread from its mundane origins at Rabwah throughout the Punjab. Despite prompt actions by governmental authorities, which included the imposition of Section 144 of the Pakistan Penal Code throughout the Punjab and the closing of all schools in the Punjab, forty-two deaths resulted, twenty-seven of whom were Ahmadis.⁶⁰

Federal governmental policy relevant to the incident proceeded through two stages, each heralded by a speech of Prime Minister Bhutto. The first speech, delivered on June 3, was a reaction to incendiary statements of the opposition members of the National Assembly. Bhutto called upon the Assembly to discontinue debate on Rabwah. He claimed that the problem should be discussed at the "right moment and at the right place" and that the National Assembly was neither. "We must first discuss the issue in camera and come to some conclusion." He called on the Assembly to delay its debate until the report of the Samdani Commission was finalized (a commission appointed by Punjab Chief Minister Haneef Ramay to discuss the issue). Later in the speech Bhutto attacked the opposition politicians, mostly *ulema*, for bringing up the constitutional issue of representation of Ahmadis so soon after their acquiescence in the adoption of the new (1973) constitution.

The opposition, however, was not to be denied. After a brief boycott of the Assembly meetings, opposition leaders called for a meeting to be held on June 9 at Lahore. At the meeting it was decided to take direct action against the Ahmadi on June 14. Bhutto, working to head off a direct confrontation with the *ulema*, met leaders of various opposition groups during June 11 and 12. The fruit of these meetings resulted in a second speech to the National Assembly on June 13. It advanced three main points:

1. It placed the whole issue of Rabwah before the National Assembly.
2. Bhutto declared himself a firm believer in *khatm-i-nabuwat*. He further asserted that the constitution already required a President or a Prime Minister to be a follower of the doctrine.
3. The speech called the issue "delicate and difficult" and consequently its proper forum was the people. "We believe in democracy and we cannot ignore the people on any matter."

Obviously, this constituted a reversal of Bhutto's earlier position. Two factors help explain the reversal. First, Bhutto feared the consequences of direct action by the *ulema*. He was all too aware of the dire aftermath of a similar set of circumstances in 1953. Second, Bhutto's administration was under a great deal of pressure during the early part of 1974. Opposition spokesmen had claimed for months that Bhutto was pro-Ahmadi, some even claimed that he was an Ahmadi. Bhutto's decision to turn the issue over to the National Assembly, a pro forma first step towards the eventual designation of Ahmadis as non-Muslims, served to silence his critics and to buttress the sagging fortunes of his administration.

In any case, on June 30 the National Assembly was convened as a Committee of the Whole to debate the Ahmadi issue. The committee was directed to perform three functions: "(1) To discuss the question of the status in Islam of persons that do not believe in the Finality of the Prophet. (2) To receive suggestions from its members. (3) To make recommendations on the above." After five weeks of debate both branches of the National Assembly (National Assembly 131 for, 0 against, 14 abstentions; Senate 31 for, 0 against, 14 abstentions) passed a bill declaring the Ahmadiyya to be a non-Muslim minority. This was later incorporated into the 1973 constitution as an amendment to article 260:

A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified Finality of Prophethood of Muhammad the last of the prophets or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad or recognizes such a claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the constitution or law.

The Aftermath of Rabwah and Zia's Nizam-i-Mustapha

The most immediate and perhaps most important effect of the National Assembly legislation and the subsequent constitutional revision was to quieten sectarian strife regarding the Ahmadi issue. Indeed, these actions were greeted with grudging acceptance by the heretofore disaffected *ulema* as a step in the right direction; and the Ahmadiyya while deploring the actions of the government, interpreted the effect of the actions as only marginally detrimental to the organizational bases of the community. With the benefit of hindsight, the policies were moderate. In practice the government's actions merely prohibited Ahmadis from holding the position of President or Prime Minister in the federal government (at best given the small size of the Ahmadi population an unlikely prospect in any case). Further, the dominant perspective of Ahmadi leaders was that Ahmadis, without dissimulation, could declare themselves Muslims and hence technically able to hold such "prohibited" posts.⁶¹

Despite the moderate formal intentions of government policy, the declaration also tacitly encouraged immoderate expectations on the part of anti-Ahmadi elements. And indirectly the policy prompted officials to enthusiastically implement public sanctions against the Ahmadiyya. For instance, several Ahmadi *ulema* were arrested (1976-1984) for possession of Mahmud Ahmad's interpretation of the Holy Quran;⁶² five Ahmadi students were denied admission to a B.Phil. programme at the University of Punjab for misrepresentation on application forms (they had declared themselves "Muslims" on the form);⁶³ and there were numerous reports of alleged widespread discrimination against Ahmadis in public and private employment.⁶⁴ In 1981, the Lahore High Court ruled that Ahmadis (as non-Muslims) could not inherit land from Muslims, finding that article 260(3) of the constitution (see above) was a declaratory judgement (i.e. Ahmadis had always been non-Muslims)

making the application of laws pertaining to their non-Muslim status retrospective before 1974.⁶⁵

More importantly, Bhutto's policies merely delayed the promulgation of demands calling for further sanctions against the Ahmadiyya. In 1976, a group of *ulema* brought a revision petition to the Lahore High Court challenging the right of Ahmadis to call *azan* (the Muslim call to prayer); to call their place of worship *masjid*; to perform prayer rituals which resemble the prayer of the *Sharia*; or to recite the Quran. In a carefully crafted decision, Justice Aftab Husain (later Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court), rejected the plaint on the grounds that Islam and Pakistan's constitution protect the rights of non-Muslims to practise their religion.

... I have not come across a single instance in Islamic history where the non-Muslim subjects or non-Muslim conquered in war have been subjected to religious intolerance or their freedom to practise their religions has ever been curtailed or interfered with.⁶⁶

... In my view the fundamental rights [of the 1973 constitution] should be interpreted as far as possible in the light of the injunctions of the Holy Quran and ethical values of Islam.⁶⁷

But the narrowly defined interpretation of the scope of Ahmadi restrictions could not withstand the repeated and persistent challenges of the *ulema*. Further, the *ulema*'s demands were given new life subsequent to President Zia ul Haq's promulgation of *nizam-i-mustapha* (order of the Prophet). Clearly, two effects of Zia's Islamization policies were of critical importance to the Ahmadi issue. First, the Islamization programme raised the stakes of the definition of who was a Muslim. Second, Islamization increased the political visibility and clout of the *ulema*. Consequently, anti-Ahmadi demands re-emerged in late 1983-84 through the vehicle of the resurgent *khatm-i-nabuwat* movement.

The Tehrik Khatm-i-Nabuwat is a spiritual descendant and arguably a lineal descendant of the Ahrar. Its primary organizational raison d'être, as its name implies, has been to protect Islamic orthodoxy concerning the Finality of the Prophethood and consequently to combat the "heretical" doctrine of the Ahmadiyya. It is primarily composed of Sunni *ulema* (though its membership includes some prominent Shias as well) and it has ties to the Jamaat-i-Islami

and the Council of Islamic Ideology. The political style of the Tehrik Khatm-i-Nabuwat is also reminiscent of the Ahrar – the movement relies on episodic urban protests (termed "conferences") in which relevant demands are voiced before enthusiastic and sympathetic audiences. Although the Tehrik has existed as an organization for the last two decades its activities were insignificant until early 1984. Heartened by the rumour of recommendations made by the Council of Islamic Ideology which reputedly called for further sanctions against the Ahmadiyya,⁶⁸ the Tehrik staged several well-attended "moots" during March and April 1984. Although members of the Tehrik Khatm-i-Nabuwat spoke with several voices during the conferences several recurring demands can be delineated:⁶⁹

1. removal of Ahmadis from civil bureaucratic and military posts;
2. closure of Ahmadi mosques;
3. prohibition against Ahmadis calling *azan*;
4. holding of a fresh national census to determine the religious affiliation of Pakistani citizens, with criminal penalties for dissemblers;⁷⁰
5. prohibition of missionary activity by Ahmadis;
6. renaming of Rabwah by the government;
7. governmental nationalization of Ahmadi *waqf*;
8. prohibition of publication or dissemination of Ahmadi books and literature;
9. confiscation of all Ahmadi books and literature;
10. return of Muhammed Aslam Qureshi (a Sunni *alim*) allegedly kidnapped by Ahmadis in 1967 and held prisoner ever since (perhaps at Rabwah) by the community.

As the spring wore on, the anti-Ahmadi agitation gained momentum. On April 11, spokesmen for the movement grew bold enough to announce plans for an All-Pakistan Conference to be held in Rawalpindi on April 27, and issued a warning to the government that if their demands were not met the Tehrik would launch "direct action" after April 30.⁷¹

President Zia's response to the demands of the *ulema* proved to be a combination of the carrot and the stick. On April 14 in a television broadcast, Zia called the Qadianis "hypocrites" and warned that the "Qadianis would not be able to preach their teachings among the Muslims."⁷² This action did not forestall the further promulgation of

demands by the *ulema*, nor did it delay the plans for the Rawalpindi conference. At the eleventh hour and doubtless mindful of the consequences of Ahmadi-*ulema* confrontation in the past, Zia acted on April 26 by issuing an anti-Ahmadi ordinance (Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984)⁷³ and simultaneously ordering the arrest of dozens of *ulema* associated with the Tehrik Khatm-i-Nabuwat. In the short term such actions served their purpose; the *ulema's* direct action campaign was derailed. Although the Rawalpindi conference was held it was poorly attended, heavily policed, and proved a relatively tame affair. Domestic reaction to Zia's policies was generally favourable; clearly a predominant majority of Pakistanis consider the Ahmadis a non-Muslim group. But as was the case with the National Assembly's actions in 1974, the *ulema* did not get all that it wanted, nor did Zia's actions finally resolve the issue.

Specifically, the ordinance added two new clauses to the Pakistan Penal Code. They read:

- 298-B. *Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages and places.* – (1) Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves "Ahmadis" or any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visual representation, –
- (a) refers to or addresses, any person other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as "Ameer-ul-Mumineen," "Khalifa-tul-Mumineen," "Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen" [all denoting Head or Chief of the Muslim Ummah], "Sahaabi" [best of Muslims], "Razi Allah Anho" [a form or blessing for the companions of the Holy Prophet];
 - (b) refers to, or addresses any person, other than the wife of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), as Ummul-Mumineen [mother of the Muslims];
 - (c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ahle-bait; or
 - (d) refers to, or names, or calls his place of worship as "masjid"; shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for

a term which may extend to three years, and shall be also liable to fine.

- (2) Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as "azan," or recites azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

298-C. *Person of Qadiani group etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith.* Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall be liable to fine.⁷⁴

As is apparent from the foregoing, the anti-Ahmadi ordinance did not address the great bulk of the *ulema's* demands. Most importantly, it did not call for procedures to dismiss Ahmadis from governmental posts, nor did it call for a fresh census. Understandably then, leaders of the Tehrik Khatm-i-Nabuwat interpreted the government's actions as constituting only a "partial victory." And in numerous statements, many made by those recently released from jail, the *ulema* vowed to press their demands on government until they were met in full.

The Ahmadis challenged the ordinance in court. In a series of *Shariat* petitions to the Federal Shariat Court, attorneys representing the Ahmadis argued that the anti-Ahmadi ordinance was un-Islamic. Four propositions were advanced derived from the Quran and *Sunna*:

1. There should be no compulsion in religion.
2. There should be no restraint against voluntary conversion to it.
3. No one may be turned out of his religion by use of force.

4. No one who does not want to stick to his religion should be stopped from forsaking it.⁷⁵

In a lengthy judgement (120 printed pages) the court accepted the foregoing propositions but ruled that none of them applied to the anti-Ahmadi ordinance. The logic of the court was that since the Ahmadi community were "non-Muslim" (the bulk of the decision is concerned with proving this proposition⁷⁶) it follows that prohibiting the use of terms used only by Muslims or the use of *azan*, also an exclusive Muslim practice, did not constitute a restriction of religious freedom. That is, non-Muslims by definition do not perform the religious rituals nor indulge in the religious practices of Muslims. Therefore, the anti-Ahmadi ordinance takes away no rights because Ahmadis are non-Muslims.⁷⁷ The circularity of this argument is obvious, if the logic is flawless. The court also rejected the argument that the Ahmadi ordinance had violated Quranic injunctions against religious intolerance.⁷⁸ Although it is clear that the Quran enjoins religious toleration, such toleration does not extend to harming the true expression of Islam. Comparing the practice of Ahmadi polemicists to that of a "trader passing off his inferior goods as superior to those of a reputable firm,"⁷⁹ the court argued that the benefit of maintaining the purity of Islamic beliefs (as understood by the predominant majority in Pakistan) outweighs the cost of a marginal reduction in religious toleration of a non-Muslim minority.

As was the case in previous applications of anti-Ahmadi policies, the effects of formal governmental actions have spread since the promulgation of the ordinance. One effect was constitutional. The restored and revised 1985 constitution reserved seats for Ahmadi candidates through separate electorates, to the Majlis-i-Shura (article 51-2(a)) and to the Provincial Assemblies (article 106-3).⁸⁰ Less formal have been actions taken by local authorities to ban loudspeakers from certain Ahmadi mosques, to close others, and to deface the *kalima* in others. Also, several Ahmadis have been arrested for possessing and distributing Ahmadi literature, and others for wearing the *kalima-i-tayyaba* around their necks.⁸¹ Arguably, the formal governmental actions have also encouraged acts of over-zealousness by officials,⁸² or of lawlessness by anti-Ahmadi elements. There have been numerous documented instances of harassment, Ahmadi mosque burnings, and at least one murder of an Ahmadi citizen.⁸³ One obvious conclusion proven by the events

since the passage of the anti-Ahmadi ordinances, is that the issue is far from its ultimate resolution. The issue of the status of Ahmadis, their relation to Islam, and the various implications that this relationship has for the future of Pakistan, are likely to plague Pakistan's decision-makers in the foreseeable future.

Policy Logic

Our analysis has left one fundamental issue unresolved. Namely, why were the Ahmadis singled out? Undoubtedly, it is arguable that the Ahmadiyya are a non-Muslim minority. But there is an almost equally compelling argument that several other religious groups within Pakistan are also non-Muslim minorities. Obviously, a case could be made for considering the Ismailis, the Baha'i, the Zikris, and some tribal elements in Chitral as non-Muslims. None of these groups, however, has been declared non-Muslim, nor is there significant sentiment within Pakistan for such declarations. I argue, therefore, that one must look beyond the issue of religious orthodoxy to explain the phenomenon of Ahmadi-Muslim relations in Pakistan. To adequately explain the relationship requires that one must look at the policy logic underlying the actions of Pakistan's decision-makers.

There have been three critical junctures in Ahmadi-governmental relations since partition: the Punjab disturbances of 1953-54; the Rabwah incident of 1974; and the adoption of the anti-Ahmadi ordinances in 1984. In each instance, the formulation of governmental policy should be viewed in the context of the environment facing the relevant decision-makers.

In the original crisis, Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin's fundamental concern was to orchestrate the passage of Pakistan's first indigenously drafted constitution. Efforts in this direction had been thwarted in the past (1947-1953) by the objections of conservative *ulema*, who were seeking the passage of an Islamic constitution. In this context the Punjab disturbances, in which prominent *ulema* were implicated as provocateurs, provided a pretext for the government to discredit and punish individual *alims*; and by implication to discredit the political views of opponents of the adoption of a secular constitution. It is important to note that two of the most prominent opponents of a secular constitution, Maulana Maududi and Maulana Niazi, were imprisoned for their participation in the disturbances

after the release of the *Munir Report*, authored by Muhammad Munir, an outspoken champion of modernist interpretations of Islam. It is also important to note that the sentences meted out to Maududi and Niazi were commuted to time served after the constitution was adopted in 1956.

The second crisis, the Rabwah incident, can also be explained in terms of the motivations of relevant decision-makers. Prime Minister Bhutto and his administration were particularly vulnerable to charges of un-Islamic behaviour and policy. Bhutto's personal life was decidedly western, and his policies were motivated more by ideological concerns than religious prescriptions. As his popularity began to wane in 1973, and as the charges of the opposition escalated, Bhutto seized upon the opportunity provided by the Rabwah incident to demonstrate his attachment to Islam. Deftly dodging a personal decision on the issue, Bhutto passed the baton to the National Assembly whose decision was a foregone conclusion – the declaration of the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims. The vote was unanimous, although there were several abstentions. It is not politic to be perceived as anti-Islamic in an Islamic state.

The events of 1984 can be explained in a similar fashion. President Zia, architect and expositor of the *nizam-i-mustapha* could not resist the pressures of the *ulema* to take further action against the Ahmadiyya. The *ulema* (particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami) after all, provided the only consistent and firm support for his administration. Also, perhaps Zia owed the Jamaat-i-Islami a political debt for remaining loyal despite his banning of student unions (the largest the Jamaat-i-Tulaba, a branch of the Jamaat-i-Islami) earlier in the year. Zia's policies, therefore, both underscored the Islamic nature of his regime as well as meeting the demands of his constituency.

One constant throughout our story has been the animosity of the orthodox *ulema*. Undoubtedly, part of this animosity can be explained by reference to religious differences. To the *ulema* the Ahmadiyya are a heretical community. But, it must also be stressed that the *ulema's* opposition stems from political as well as religious differences. Ever since the promulgation of Ghulam Ahmad's call to support British rule, the methods and goals of the two groups have been at odds. Since partition this has been reinforced by the Ahmadis' (particularly Lahoris') secular vision of the future of Pakistan. The Ahmadiyya lean to the West in political ideology. Their most prominent members are models of successful western-

ization (e.g. Abdus Salem and Mohammed Zafarullah Khan); their most prominent missions are in the West (US and Great Britain); and their ethos of upward mobility through education partakes of a western world view. Accordingly, Ahmadis are not only the religious rivals of the orthodox *ulema* but their ideological and political rivals as well.

Yet we are still left with the enigma of why the Ahmadis have played such a major role in the politics of Pakistan. Three suggestions come to mind.

First is the style of Ahmadi polemic. Since Ghulam Ahmad's first prayer duel, the Ahmadiyya have been able and willing competitors for the hearts and minds of adherents. The early Ahmadis were uncompromising in their missionary activity; later Ahmadis have adopted a more subtle approach – scholarship. In other words, the Ahmadis have kept a high profile; their missionary activity and religious exegesis cannot be ignored by would-be opponents.

Second, the Ahmadiyya, despite its ideological and religious significance, is a relatively small community. The exact number of Ahmadis is hard to gauge. The census of 1981 (see Table 1) reported that there were only 104,000 Ahmadis in Pakistan – 0.12 per cent of the total population of 81 million. Both Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis argue that this number is greatly deflated. Ahmadis argue that the government has systematically underrepresented the strength of the Ahmadi community in order to downplay its importance. Opponents of the Ahmadiyya argue that the low census totals are the result of large-scale dissimulation by Ahmadis who allegedly report themselves as "Muslim." In any case, disregarding the more extreme claims of either camp, the Ahmadi population certainly does not exceed 2 per cent of Pakistan's population.⁸⁴ Consequently, the Ahmadis constitute a small minority of Pakistan's population. Given this demographic fact, Ahmadi demands can be ignored with relative impunity, and their positions portrayed as those of an extreme and inconsequential minority. Also, anti-Ahmadi policies gain immediate numerical support from the predominant Muslim majority – by definition they are "popular."

Finally, the Ahmadi community has been perceived by its opponents as disproportionately favoured in the national political institutions of the state. Such a perception traces its origins to the belief that the Ahmadis were protected and promoted under British raj (which incidentally explains, as opponents of the Ahmadi argue,

Ghulam Ahmad's ready acceptance of British colonial rule). Since partition such "advantages" have continued. Ahmadis are primarily Urdu-speaking; they are disproportionately well educated; and they have disproportionately sought careers in modern, western occupations. Many Ahmadis have also been very prominent in their chosen fields. This helps explain claims advanced by anti-Ahmadi groups that Ahmadis have controlled both the civilian and military bureaucracy of Pakistan. Although documentation for such claims is difficult to gather and highly suspect in any case, there is evidence that Ahmadis are overrepresented in the civilian bureaucracy. An examination of Table 2 reveals that Ahmadis are overrepresented in the bureaucracy by a factor of three to eight times their proportional population base.⁸⁵ However, by no means can it be inferred from this that the Ahmadiyya control (as some Ahmadi opponents claim) or even significantly influence the overall composition of the bureaucracy – less than 1 per cent of Pakistan's civil bureaucracy are Ahmadis. A similar conclusion emerges from a consideration of Ahmadi representation in public corporations (see Table 3). Further, although the Ahmadiyya may be overrepresented in the military such "overrepresentation" is inconsequential. In 1984, there was only one Ahmadi general; and there were only a handful of other senior Ahmadi officers in the military.⁸⁶

The claim that an ethnic minority is overrepresented in national institutions and that such an anomaly should be redressed in favour of the majority community is hardly a novel policy demand (e.g. Sinhalese vs. Tamil demands in Sri Lanka; Assamese demands vs. Bengalis, etc.), nor is the demand that "unreliable" ethnic minorities not be entrusted with sensitive military and bureaucratic posts.⁸⁷ But in Pakistan, as our data indicate, the case of Ahmadi overrepresentation is exaggerated by ideological and political opponents of the Ahmadiyya. This is hardly surprising given the turbulent history of Ahmadi-Muslim interaction which this paper has described.

Table 1: *Pakistan — Religion by Province, 1982 (in thousands)*

Area	Religion					
	Muslim	Percentage Muslims	Ahmadi	Christian	Hindu	Others*
Punjab	46110	98	64	1061	29	28
Islamabad	331	97	1	8	—	—
NWFP	11003	99	11	39	4	3
FATA	2190	99	1	6	1	—
Sind (inc. Karachi)	17557	92	21	177	1221	52
Baluchistan	4258	98	6	20	20	—
Pakistan	81450	97	104	1310	1276	113

* Includes Parsis, Sikhs, Jews, and Buddhists.

Source: Adapted from Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, *1981 Census Report of Punjab Province; 1981 Census Report of North West Frontier Province; 1981 Census Report of Sind Province; and 1981 Census Report of Baluchistan Province* (Islamabad: Census Organization Printing Press, 1984).

Table 2: *Federal Government Civil Servants by Grade and Religion, 1983*

Grade	Religion										Total	
	Muslim	Ahmadi	Hindu (Caste)	Hindu (Non Caste)	Buddhist	Christian	Jew	Parsi	Others	No Response		
22	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	58
21	108	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	120
20	548	7	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	15	573
19	1022	13	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	27	1065
18	2374	22	5	1	1	3	0	0	2	2	47	2455
17	4173	21	7	2	1	6	1	1	1	1	75	4288
16	4984	31	5	1	4	42	0	1	6	6	113	5187
Total	13,264	94	18	4	8	53	2	2	9	9	292	13,746

Table 2 Contd.

Grade	Muslim	Ahmadi	Hindu (Caste)	Hindu (Non Caste)	Buddhist	Christian	Jew	Parsi	Others	No Response	Total
15	542	6	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	4	555
14	2589	12	2	1	0	7	0	0	2	31	2644
13	1264	7	1	0	2	3	0	0	2	10	1289
12	1032	4	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	21	1060
11	14133	84	11	1	3	74	1	0	33	306	14646
10	3068	9	1	1	1	22	0	0	1	60	3163
9	1406	7	3	0	0	7	0	0	2	35	1460
8	6830	23	7	2	2	43	1	0	9	186	7103
7	29990	130	20	12	9	160	1	0	70	1070	31462
6	2465	14	0	0	0	11	0	0	5	51	2546
5	17331	43	9	2	0	85	1	2	37	446	17961
4	9417	30	6	1	1	65	1	0	45	535	10101
3	4255	9	1	2	0	30	0	0	18	189	4504
2	11805	45	5	4	9	97	2	1	26	540	12534
1	25487	82	115	73	6	1100	0	4	96	1407	28370
Total	1,31,614	510	182	100	34	1,706	7	7	347	4,891	1,39,398
G. Total	1,44,878	604	200	104	42	1,759	9	9	356	5,183	1,53,144
	94.60	.39	.13	.07	.03	1.15	.01	.01	.23	3.38	100.00

Source: Government of Pakistan, Public Administration Research Centre, O/M Division, Cabinet Secretariat, *Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report January 1983*, Islamabad: Barqson's, 1984, p. 134.

Table 3: *Employees of Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous Corporations/Bodies under the Administrative Control of the Federal Government by Religion, 1986*

Pay Scale (Maximum)	Muslim	Ahmadi	Hindu (Caste)	Hindu (Non Caste)	Buddhist	Christian	Jews	Parsi	Others	No Res- ponse	Total
Rs 6500 or above	758	5	0	0	0	8	0	2	0	3	776
Rs 6000 to Rs 6499	675	3	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	6	687
Rs 5240 to Rs 5999	897	8	0	0	0	5	0	5	0	5	920
Rs 4480 to 5239	3517	20	3	2	0	16	0	8	0	21	3587
Rs 3040 to Rs 4479	23535	200	74	12	1	105	0	20	9	130	24086
Rs 2250 to Rs 3039	30220	178	49	8	2	195	0	16	6	169	30843
Rs 1400 to Rs 2249	48382	236	69	20	0	455	0	9	1	567	49752
Rs 0760 to Rs 1399	176917	489	402	181	7	2418	4	7	47	2399	182871
Rs 640 to Rs 759	30997	62	217	91	5	2786	2	0	14	415	34589
Rs 639 or less	9272	19	23	15	0	303	0	0	1	131	9764
Grand Total	3,25,170	1,220	838	329	15	6,293	6	67	91	3846	3,37,875

Source: Government of Pakistan, Public Administration Research Centre, O/M Division, Cabinet Secretariat, *First Census of Employees of Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous Corporations/Bodies under the Federal Government*, Islamabad: Barqson's, 1986, p. 74.

NOTES

- Material for this paper was gathered during the past thirteen years. My original efforts resulted in a Master's thesis (1975) written for the Department of Political Science at Duke University under the direction of Ralph Braibanti. As a by-product of several research trips to Pakistan (American Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1975-76, 1982, 1987, and Fulbright, 1984-1985) I have been able to add the additional information provided here. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of Wake Forest University, particularly the Research and Publication Fund of the Graduate School and the Archie Fund.
1. Hence the term "Qadiani" is often employed to refer to members of the Ahmadiyya community.
 2. See for instance Abdul Hamid, *Islam and Christianity*, New York: Carlton Press, 1967, p. 149; and Nuruddin Muneer, "The Promised Messiah: A Life Sketch," *Review of Religions* (March 1973), pp. 108-109.
 3. Spencer Lavan, *The Ahmadiyya Movement: A History and Perspective*, Delhi: Manohar, 1974, p. 23.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
 5. See for instance S. Abdulhasan Nadvi, *Qadianism: A Critical Study*, Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research Publications, 1967, pp. 9-12.
 6. This fact is emphasized by Ahmadi historians to disprove theories of the alleged conspiratorial relationship between Ghulam Ahmad and the English. Anti-Ahmadis stress that Ghulam's legal experience provided the basis for his later sympathy with the colonial power. See Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31, and Nadvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-92.
 7. Hamid, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
 8. Ghulam Ahmad, "How to Get Rid of the Bondage of Sin," *Review of Religions* (June 1972), p. 180.
 9. Ghulam Ahmad, *Jesus in India*, Qadian: Nazir Dawa-o-Tabligh, n.d., p. 17.
 10. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
 11. Chaudri Ali Muhammad, "In the Company of the Promised Messiah," *Review of Religions* (1972), p. 13.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Lavan, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
 15. C. Ali Muhammad, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
 16. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 115.
 17. Quoted in Lavan, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
 18. C. Ali Muhammad, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
 19. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-18.
 20. Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.
 21. C. Ali Muhammad, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
 22. This is Ghulam Ahmad's simplified version of the *mahdi* in the Islamic tradition.
 23. Ghulam Ahmad, *Jesus in India*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-11.
 24. Jesus' ointment has both an ancient and modern history. In 1893, an Ahmadi *hakim*, Muhammad Hussain, decided to attempt a concoction of the substance. Accordingly, he searched the medieval medical books which Ghulam Ahmad had cited as evidence of the elixir and managed to collect and combine the various ingredients. Hussain, a bit of an entrepreneur, bottled the substance and declared it a panacea for hurts and wounds. See C. Ali Muhammad, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
 25. Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

26. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam: A Solution of Five Fundamental Religious Problems from the Muslim Point of View*, London: Luzac, 1910, p. 183.
27. Ghulam Ahmad, "My Beliefs and My Call," *Review of Religions* (1971), p. 321.
28. Ghulam Ahmad, "The Will of the Promised Messiah," *Review of Religions* (1906), pp. 30-31.
29. Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-101.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.
31. Nadvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-23.
32. Lavan, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
33. Yasin Butt, "A Khalif Cannot be Removed from His Divine Office," *Review of Religions* (1967). For more details see A.G. Soofi, "Khalifat in Islam," *Review of Religions* (1972).
34. Abdul Ghafoor Soofi, *Moon in the East: A Short Biography of the late Khalifatul Masih II*, *Review of Religions* (published serially 1970-1975) (1971), pp. 233-234.
35. *Ibid.* (1972), p. 283.
36. For details see *ibid.*, pp. 275-293.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
39. Mahmud Ahmad, *Ahmadiyyat, Or the True Islam*, Washington, D.C.: American Fazl Mosque, 1951, pp. 10-11.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
42. Lavan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
43. Soofi, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-52.
44. For details of expected atrocities at the hands of Hindus, see Hamid, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
45. Soofi, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
46. Mahmud Ahmad, *New World Order of Islam* (Qadian: Tehrik-i-Jadid, 1945), p. 44.
47. Quoted in Soofi, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
48. For details see Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-160.
49. Muhammad Iqbal, *Islam and Ahmadism*, Lahore: Anjuman-i-Khaddam-ud-Din, n.d., pp. 14-15.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 21; pp. 24-26.
52. Lavan, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-168.
53. Government of Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances*, Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1954, esp. Part VI, pp. 287-387. Muhammad Munir was chairman. Hereinafter referred to as the *Munir Report*. Also see Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1982.
54. *Munir Report*, p. 127; pp. 125-129.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 250-253. Also see S. Abul a'la Maududi, *The Qadiani Problem*, Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1979.
56. *Munir Report*, p. 156.
57. Bashir Ahmad, *The Truth about Khatm-i-Nabuwat*, Qadian: Saqr Anjuman Ahmadiyya, 1967, pp. 11-12.
58. For details of this position see Muhammad Zafarulla Khan, *Muhammad: Seal of the Prophets*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
59. See for instance, Nasir Ahmad, "Nobody Dare Call Us Non-Muslim," *Review of Religions* (1973), pp. 178-182.
60. This section is compiled from newspaper accounts found in *Dawn* and *Pakistan Times*, March-October, 1974 and from personal interviews 1975-1987.

61. See Nasir Ahmad, *op. cit.*; and Md. Zafarulla Khan, *op. cit.*
62. Published in the West as Mahmud Ahmad, *Introduction to the Holy Quran*, London: London Mosque, 1949.
63. Interviews 1982.
64. Many such violations are chronicled in *Ahmadiyya Digest*, an official publication of the Ahmadiyya in Washington D.C. Also personal interviews 1982.
65. Muhammad Ashraq vs. Mst. Niamet Bibi *PLD* 1981 Lah 520.
66. Abdur Rehman Mobashir vs. Amir Ali Shah *PLD* 1978 Lah 113; p. 185.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
68. The recommendations were never officially released nor published.
69. Personal interviews (1984-85) and newspaper reports April 1984.
70. It is widely believed by both Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis that the 1981 census significantly underrepresented the Ahmadi population. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the next section.
71. *Dawn*, April 12, 1984.
72. *Muslim*, April 15, 1984.
73. Anti-Islamic Activities of Qadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984. Ordinance XX of 1984 *PLD* 1984 Central Statutes 102.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
75. Majibur Rehman vs. Federal Government of Pakistan *PLD* 1985 FSC 8, p. 89.
76. There is no detailed treatment of the Ahmadi petition until page 84 of the decision. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-120.
78. See the earlier High Court judgement, Abdur Rehman Mobashir vs. Amir Ali Shah *PLD* 1978 Lah 113.
79. Majibur Rehman Vs. Federal Government of Pakistan, p. 100.
80. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (as modified up to 19th March 1985)* (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1985). As an act of protest no Ahmadi stood for either the vacant Majlis-i-Shura or Provincial Assembly seats. President Zia filled the vacancies by appointing non-Muslim women (Christians and Hindus) to the posts.
81. Newspaper reports, *Dawn* and *Muslim*, 1985 and interviews. Amnesty International reported that in April-May 1985 over 100 Ahmadis were arrested and detained for "some weeks" in Tharparkar district (Sind). Some, they charged, were beaten by the police. *Amnesty International Report*, London: Amnesty International Report Publications, 1986, p. 247.
82. Amnesty International reported a case in Mardan in which two brothers (shop owners) were arrested because the cash receipt pad in the shop was inscribed: "In the Name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful." Both were sentenced to five years imprisonment. *Amnesty International Report*, London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987, pp. 257-258.
83. Dr. Akil bin Abdul Kadir, an eye surgeon was murdered on June 9, 1985 in Hyderabad. Other murders have also been alleged.
84. In the course of personal interviews during 1982, 1984 and 1985 estimates of the Ahmadi population ranged from 100,000 to 10 million.
85. Depending upon the overall estimate of the Ahmadi population in the state.
86. Personal interviews, 1984, 1985.
87. See Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980.