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“Those who leave the Ahmadiyya jama’at will never prosper–This is a sign from Allah.”

Intro
The Mirza family has taught Ahmadi’s to believe in some sick and twisted ideas, that’s for sure.  Yet another one is the idea that all Ex-Ahmadi’s will fail and never prosper.  This ideology isn’t written down and expressed in Ahmadiyya literature as such, however, it is ingrained into the psyche of every Ahmadi, especially the laymans, which for the vast majority of Ahmadi’s.  In my interactions with the African-Ahmadi’s, this is the theme of their arguments, they cite the death of Zia, Bhutto, King Faisal and etc etc etc as proof.  Ahmadi’s are taught group superiority myths by the Mirza family and were radicalized by the Mirza Tahir Ahmad in the 80’s.

Ahmadiyya only rules

  1. Bad things happen to you (and you’re a believer) –> it’s a test.

  2. Bad things happen to you (and you’re a disbeliever) –> it’s a punishment.

  3. Good things happen to you –> it’s only through the blessings of God

Ironically, Ahmadi converts are not taught this as vice versa
As for the case of Ahmadiyya attitude, When a new convert of Ahmadiyya faces misfortune it is the test of their faith from Allah. If they prosper, it is the blessings of Allah. If someone who leaves is struck with a misfortune, it is the punishment of Allah.

Tags
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Mosqueattack #trueislam

Can @AtifRMian be trusted by the Pakistani government and Muslim people?


Intro

Recently, Prime Minister Imran Khan has constituted an 18-member Economic Advisory Council (EAC) with the induction of a few world-renowned economists to ensure the availability of best possible professional advice to the government on economic policies.  Just a few weeks ago, Professor Atif Mian wrote an op-ed that was published in the Dawn newspaper, in this he gave 3 crucial areas that needed reform in Pakistan’s economic future.  However, Atif Mian doesn’t understand that Pakistan was invented solely for the purpose of failing.  Pakistan was created by the British as a buffer state, and is thus economically unstable.  Pakistan doesn’t have a proper product mix, nor does it generate enough tax revenue to break even, nor has it ever.  Nonetheless, we have collected lots of data on this topic and have shared in the below.

Atif Mian left Islam for Ahmadiyya after the 9-11 attacks
If you read his short story, this is the general impression.  He has never written academically in terms of Ahmadiyya, nor has he engaged anyone on social media in discussion.  See here: https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/09/06/atif-mians-conversion-to-ahmadiyya-story/.  Nabeel Qureshi also felt some sort of resentment with Islam after the 9-11 attacks.

Ahmadi’s are loyal to the Mirza family, no one else and have political backing from the UN
Ahmadi’s can never be trusted.  This is similar to how a Sikh killed the Prime Minister in India, thus raising the question of allegiance in India.  Thus, Pakistani’s are highly concerned with Ahmadi’s and their allegiance to the Mirza family.  Furthermore, Atif Mian cannot be trusted, since we know that he will be leaking all internal affairs data from this committee to his Khalifa in London.

Zafrullah Khan helped Ahmadi’s get into high military positions and civil service
When Zafrullah Khan was foreign minister of Pakistan, he helped Ahmadi’s get good jobs at a disproportionate rate (see Brush).  Ahmadi’s continued to be favored in Ayub Khan’s government in the 60’s.  It wasn’t until 1974, then Ahmadi’s were finally ousted.

If Atif Mian works with this council, does he agree with all the laws of Pakistan?
Remember, Ahmadi’s go around and call all Muslims as Terrorists if they consider Ahmadi’s as non-Muslims.  Well, its the law in Pakistan, and thus Ahmadi’s like Qasim Rashid and many others, consider all Muslims as terrorists.  Will they consider Atif Mian also a terrorist since he is helping such a government?  https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/?s=Brown

The US Govt has cut funding to Pakistan
https://www.google.com/search?q=US+cuts+funding+to+Pakistan&rlz=1C1SQJL_enUS803US803&oq=US+cuts+funding+to+Pakistan&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l4.3958j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

No developing country should ever trust the IMF or WB
FACTS!!!  pakistan has to fix their economic woes from within.  However, with corruption, its impossible.

What will IK do next?
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/364299-imran-khan-govt-in-the-ye-of-the-storm

A grandson of MGA was made an economic adviser in Pakistan in the 1960’s
Ahmadi’s were given lots of government jobs and special treatment from 1947–1974.  Read about it here: https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2016/10/15/sind-holdings-was-owned-by-mirza-muzzafar-ahmad/

IHC to hear petition against Dr Atif Mian’s appointment
https://www.samaa.tv/news/2018/09/ihc-to-hear-petition-against-dr-atif-mians-appointment/

Twitter stories
https://twitter.com/search?q=atif%20mian&src=typd

Tags
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #ahmadiyyat #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Sialkot #Mosqueattack #atifmian

Related Videos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ga24mIQDlYA

Atif Mian’s conversion to Ahmadiyya story


Intro

We wanted to post the official conversion story of Atif Mian.  He doesn’t give lots of details however, he seems to have gotten disgusted with Islam after the attacks of 9-11-01, and then converted to Ahmadiyya in haste.  We have copy and pasted the story from ““”””By the Dawn’s Early Light: Short Stories by American Converts to Islam By the Dawn’s Early Light: Short Stories by American Converts to Islam First published in the United States of America in 2009 Published by: Majlis Khuddamul Ahmadiyya USA An Auxiliary of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community 15000 Good Hope Road Silver Spring, Maryland 20905 USA””” (see page 90).

Atif Mian doesn’t give any proper reason for leaving Islam.  He has been totally silent on Jesus in India, the eclipses and many other classic irregularities with Ahmadiyya.  Just like Dr. Salam.

https://archive.org/stream/ShortStoriesAmericanConvertsToIslam/Short-Stories-American-Converts-to-Islam_djvu.txt

Related Essay’s
https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2016/12/26/dr-abdus-salam-liked-white-women-alcohol-and-a-busy-british-lifestyle/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/06/05/the-rational-reasons-behind-declaring-ahmadiyya-ahmadis-a-non-muslim-minority-in-the-constitution-of-pakistan-statistics-showing-systematic-over-representation-of-ahmadis-in-the-bureaucracy-of-pakist/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2017/07/03/abdul-sami-zafar-tells-the-inside-story-on-the-may-29th-1974-rabwah-train-attacks/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/02/10/eye-witnesses-states-that-ahmadis-has-revolvers-during-the-rabwah-incident-pakistan-times-june-19th-1974/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/07/12/mirza-nasir-ahmad-claims-that-he-was-not-in-rabwah-during-the-train-attacks-of-may-29th-1974/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2017/10/26/the-samdani-commission-interviewed-mr-arbab-alam-president-of-the-student-union-nishter-medical-college-he-was-an-eye-witness-pakistan-times-june-20th-1974/

The full story 

Atif Mian 
Chicago, Illinois 



"The greatest gift of Ahmadiyya teachings is that they 
introduce you to the true concept and reality of God." 



I was born in Nigeria in 1974 but grew up mostly in Pakistan. Looking back 
at my life, I have to admit that I have been extremely fortunate in many ways. 
I had the most loving and caring parents who sacrificed a lot for the education 
and proper upbringing of their children. I was the youngest in my family, with 
three older sisters. So you can say I was spoiled once by my mother and three 
times by my sisters. 

I would describe our household as moderately religious. My mother 
constantly taught me the value of good morals. I remember having a sense 
from a fairly young age that I was expected to do the "right thing," i.e. tell the 
truth, respect elders, not be extravagant, and so on. My parents paid great 
attention towards their children's education. They commuted long distances 
for six years just so we could go to school in Lahore where education standards 
were higher. 

When I was finishing my high school, my father encouraged me to apply 
to the U.S. for college. Luckily I got admitted to MIT and joined there in the 
fall of 1993 as a freshman. Life at MIT was quite difficult in the beginning. 
Classes were tough, language was a bit foreign, and culture was very different. 
There were adjustments to be made at many levels. It was perhaps the result 
of exposure to alternative ways of life, or perhaps the natural consequence of a 
maturing mind that I began to ponder seriously about the pre-suppositions of 
life that a child grows up with. 

I had been raised as a Muslim with a strong emphasis on the belief in God. 
I had never questioned what I had been taught thus far, but this now turned out 



Short Stories by American Converts to Islam 91 

to be an uneasy compromise. Should I believe in Islam simply because fate had 
me born into a Muslim family? Why should one take religion seriously when 
its primary determinant seems to be the flip of a coin that decides which family 
one is born into? Why should one put so many constraints on life because of a 
God that may or may not exist? 

The questions were many, but I struggled with finding acceptable answers. 
At the same time the conventional understanding of Islam seemed more and 
more intolerant and irrational to me. Muslims who advocated on behalf of 
Islam enthusiastically split hairs when it came to religious dogma, and yet 
seemed oblivious to the basic tenets of justice, tolerance and human civility. 
For example, otherwise sane looking people would actively support the idea 
that anyone who chooses to leave Islam should be condemned to death. I was 
beginning to be put off by religion. 

It was around these early years in college when I found out that an old 
friend of mine from high school, Hamid Sheikh, was an Ahmadi Muslim. I 
had known him for over eight years but never knew that he was an Ahmadi 
Muslim. My impression of Ahmadi Muslims at that time was quite negative, 
formed largely by the general social attitude towards Ahmadi Muslims in 
Pakistan. In my mind Ahmadiyya Community was some weird cult devoid of 
common sense. Therefore, when I found out that a good friend of mine was an 
Ahmadi Muslim, I was quite surprised. 

At this point, however, I was less interested in the finer details of differences 
between Ahmadiyya Islam and Sunni Islam teachings. I had enough trouble 
trying to understand religion at a basic level and did not care much about 
complicated sectarian discussions. So I badgered Hamid with some general 
questions about God, religion and the purpose of man's creation. We had 
some discussions, and Hamid gave me two books to read: Islam's Response to 
Contemporary Issues by the Fourth Khalifa, and his biography, A Man of God. 

I had been searching for a logical and humane approach towards religion 
but was disappointed with what I had found thus far. However, reading Islam's 
Response to Contemporary Issues was a totally refreshing experience. I was not 
yet ready to say that I believed in a particular religion, but I remember saying 
to myself after reading the book that if there ever were a religion worthy of 
following, it must look like the one described in that book. 

I loved the way the Fourth Khalifa approached religion. He spoke with 
the precision of a scientist. He always began with "first principles" and then 
gradually built his case through the rules of logic. There was also a deep sense 



92 BYTHE DAWN'S EARLY LIGHT 

of love, compassion and humanity in whatever he wrote or said. It is hard to 
express it in words, but I fell totally in love with his personality. 

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community began to provide me with the 
answers that I had been searching for. But conviction of the heart and mind are 
two separate issues. There were always more questions that I could have asked. 
At what point do I draw the line between skepticism and belief? 

I did not know the answer to this question. I was also perturbed by the 
idea of praying for myself. How could I do that if I were not willing to call 
myself a believer? Wouldn't that be hypocritical? Even selfish perhaps? And 
then there was the chicken and the egg problem. If one needs to have faith to 
pray sincerely, and must pray sincerely to have faith, where should I begin? 

My solution to these conundrums was that I could only pray to a possible 
God. I would pray that if You are truly there then guide me to what is right 
and what is true. In my heart I already had the suspicion that the truth might 
be Ahmadiyya. Therefore, afraid that I might stay away from it because of the 
social sanctions against it, I would add that I was willing to pay whatever price 
it took to find and accept the truth. 

Over the next few years, I continued to read whatever I could on Islam 
Ahmadiyya. I did not discuss this much with others. I preferred to study on my 
own instead. The web was a great tool for me. Alislam.org, the Community's 
website, was just beginning to develop and I must have been one of its most 
voracious consumers at the time. My greatest attractions were the "Q&A" 
sessions conducted by the Fourth Khalifa, as well as his sermons. I could spend 
hours listening to him. 

While I found the message of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community very 
attractive, I was extremely repulsed by the attitude of orthodox clerics towards 
the Community. How could they lose all sense of humanity and prevent Ahmadi 
Muslims from practicing their faith in Pakistan? How could man become 
arrogant enough to decide who is a Muslim and who is not, as a matter of law? 
It was because of such attitudes of orthodox clerics that I never took them 
seriously in their allegations against the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. 

After finishing my undergraduate education at MIT, I decided to pursue a 
doctorate in Economics, also at MIT. I finished my PhD in 2001 and moved to 
Chicago to start my first job as an Assistant Professor at University of Chicago. 
While I was in Boston, I had stopped going to the local mosque for a long 
time because I could not pray behind an Imam who condoned an intolerant 
interpretation of Islam. There was an Ahmadiyya mosque near Boston but it 



Short Stories by American Converts to Islam 93 

was far and I did not have a car. So now that I had a car in Chicago, I thought I 
should look for an Ahmadiyya Muslim mosque. 

Once I found the local Ahmadiyya Muslim mosque in Chicago, I began 
going for Friday prayers. I might have done so for the rest of my life without 
becoming an Ahmadi Muslim. I had already acknowledged that the Ahmadiyya 
interpretation of Islam was the only one that made sense. Why then go through 
the hassle of conversion and all the social conflicts that come along with it? 
After all, what is the line beyond which one says, "I believe"? The human mind 
is a specialist when it comes to making excuses. 

However something changed in March of 2002. 1 cannot say how and why. 
The Holy Prophet Muhammad said that the key to a person's heart is in Allah's 
hands. So one day Allah changed my heart. There is no other explanation for 
it. I felt a strong desire that I must sign the initiation form. I had to do it. There 
was no other option for me anymore. Like a kid in the candy store, I had to 
have it. 

My parents were quite unhappy at my decision to become an Ahmadi 
Muslim. This trial has been the most difficult for me since the last thing I ever 
wanted to do was to upset my parents in their old age. It is all the more difficult 
given how much they have done for me. But life ultimately owes its existence 
to God, and I pray that we may all find peace in Him. 

While there are sacrifices in the path of a convert, these are overshadowed 
by the fact that man at his core is a moral being. There is nothing more rewarding 
than being truthful to one's conscience. The greatest gift of Ahmadiyya teachings 
is that they introduce you to the true concept and reality of God. Everything 
that is pure and good is to be found in God. Therefore one can never be truly 
spiritual unless one tries to get closer to God by developing attributes that are 
in His likeness: developing compassion for humanity, being sincere, treating 
everyone with absolute justice, and saying the truth even when it may have 
negative immediate consequences. When one struggles to become better only 
to attain closeness to God, God never leaves such a person alone. This is the 
ultimate lesson of Islam Ahmadiyya and the ultimate gift for a convert. 

I have been fortunate to serve the Community in various capacities. One 
of my greatest joys has been the many friendships that I have formed through 
MKA. I have had the privilege of meeting many remarkable individuals whose 
sincerity, desire to serve humanity, and selfless dedication to work tirelessly 
for the good of others, leaves me awestruck. At a time when religion has been 
distorted to create mayhem in many parts of the world, the Ahmadiyya Muslim 
Community provides a true picture of what Islam is supposed to be.

Related Essays
https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/09/06/can-atifrmian-be-trusted-by-the-pakistani-government-and-muslim-people/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2017/07/03/abdul-sami-zafar-tells-the-inside-story-on-the-may-29th-1974-rabwah-train-attacks/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2016/10/15/sind-holdings-was-owned-by-mirza-muzzafar-ahmad/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/?s=Zafrullah+Khan

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/07/22/united-nations-appoints-prominent-ahmadi-muslim-barrister-mr-karim-asad-ahmad-khan-to-head-investigation-into-isis-war-crimes/

https://ahmadiyyafactcheckblog.com/2018/06/05/the-rational-reasons-behind-declaring-ahmadiyya-ahmadis-a-non-muslim-minority-in-the-constitution-of-pakistan-statistics-showing-systematic-over-representation-of-ahmadis-in-the-bureaucracy-of-pakist/

The Vangaurd of the Islamic Revolution The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan Seyed Vali Reza Nasr

Intro
We found some research work on Ahmadis and the 1953 riots.  We have pasted the data in the below, this is from a book called “The Vangaurd of the Islamic Revolution” by The Jama‘at-i Islami of Pakistan, written by Seyed Vali Reza Nasr.  

The data

The Anti-Ahmadi Controversy, 1952–1954

The status of minorities in Pakistan had long been of major concern to a number of the Islamic parties and to the ulama. Mawdudi, however, had never given much attention to what their place should be, believing that the question would be automatically resolved within the overall framework of an Islamic constitution. The other Islamic parties did not agree, particularly when it came to the Ahmadis, a sect which had emerged at the turn of the century in Punjab. The Ahmadis follow the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), who claimed he had experienced divine revelation. The orthodox believe that the Ahmadis, also known as Qadiyanis or Mirza’is, stand outside the boundaries of Islam despite the Ahmadis’ insistence that they are Muslims. For Ghulam Ahmad’s claims are incompatible with the Muslim belief that Prophet Muhammad was the last of the prophets. The opposition of the ulama to the Ahmadis predated the partition, and the Deobandis had campaigned against them as early as the 1920s. Mawlana ‘Uthmani had written a book in refutation of the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1924.

The Ahmadi issue had been the favorite of the Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam (Society of Free Muslims), a populist Islamic party created in 1930 that grew out of the Khilafat movement and that was best known for the impassioned style of its speakers. The Ahrar had vacillated between supporting the Congress and the Muslim League before partition and did not declare its allegiance to Pakistan until 1949. The one constant throughout its existence, aside from its socialism, had been its vehement opposition to the Ahmadis. The Ahrar had first expressed this opposition in 1934, when Shah ‘Ata’u’llah Bukhari, the party’s leader, had demanded the official exclusion of the Ahmadis from Islam and the dismissal of Sir Zafaru’llah Khan—the Ahmadi Muslim League leader and later Pakistan’s foreign minister—from the viceroy’s council.[65] Following partition, the erstwhile pro-Congress Ahrar moved to Pakistan, and after losing a significant portion of its membership between 1947 and 1950, its new leader, Taju’ddin Ansari, joined hands with Daultana’s faction of the Muslim League in Punjab.

With the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the Ahrar decided to utilize the state’s professed loyalty to Islam to elicit a ruling on the Ahmadis. Throughout 1949 it incited passions in Punjab against them (they had meanwhile established their Pakistan headquarters in Rabwah, not far from Lahore). The Ahrar were once again demanding the ouster of Zafaru’llah Khan, this time from the cabinet, and to weaken his position went so far as to argue that two of the defendants in the Rawalpindi conspiracy case were Ahmadis.[66] The anti-Ahmadi campaign soon found support among the ulama, and served as the foundation for a religious alliance comparable to the one forged earlier between the Jama‘at and the ulama.

The Ahrar found an unexpected ally in the putatively “progressive” chief minister of the Punjab, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, who had found the obstreperous Islamic party and the emerging anti-Ahmadi alliance a useful counterbalance to Mamdot and the Jama‘at in the election campaign. Mamdot had defected from the Muslim League earlier in that year and had formed the Jinnah Awami League. The resignation of the former chief minister had greatly damaged the Muslim League’s standing in Punjab, all the more so as Mamdot’s electoral strategy—forming alliances with the Awami League and the Jama‘at—was threatening Daultana’s position. Mamdot had been particularly effective in depicting Daultana and his allies in Karachi as “un-Islamic.”[67] The struggling Muslim League, also aware of challenges by the Jama‘at on its right and Mian Iftikharu’ddin’s Azad Pakistan party on its left could hardly withstand charges of secularism. Daultana therefore decided to mobilize the Ahrar to shore up the religious legitimacy of his ministry.

The Punjab elections became a platform for the Ahrar’s anti-Ahmadi propaganda. Daultana, bogged down in the election campaign and eager to build a base of support among the religious electorate, turned a blind eye to these activities. Nor did he show any signs of discomfort with the Ahrar following his victory in the elections. The continued pressures exerted on the Muslim League by Mamdot, Suhrawardi, Mawdudi, and Mian Iftikharu’ddin made the Ahrar an indispensable asset. Further emboldened by Daultana’s sweep of Punjab, the Ahrar set out to turn the Ahmadi issue into a national debate.

The dire economic conditions in Punjab at the time—a rise in food prices and famine precipitated by the landowners—meanwhile provided fertile ground for the Ahrar’s agitations.[68] The Islam League (formerly Tahrik-i Khaksar) had already done much to translate popular discontent into an Islamic movement. Throughout the summer of 1952, when food prices and the grain shortage reached their peak, Mawlana Mashriqi organized numerous anti-Muslim League demonstrations, demanding the amelioration of suffering and a greater Islamization of government. The economic situation in Punjab no doubt made local politics susceptible to religious activism. As social unrest spread, demonstrations led by religious activists in general and the Islam League in particular turned into riots. The Islam League’s penchant for violence convinced the government of the dangers of allowing the continued sacralization of politics and eventually led to Mashriqi’s arrest.

The Jama‘at had also tried to take advantage of popular discontent. It organized the February 24, 1952, demonstration at Machi Gate of Lahore to protest the hike in the price of wheat flour, a protest that soon turned into a riot, which was forcibly quelled by the police. Although the Islam League and the Communists were implicated by the authorities as the main culprits, the role of the Jama‘at in the whole affair did not go unnoticed.[69] It was, however, the Ahrar, with its socialist leanings, that assumed the role of the Islam League after Mashriqi was arrested. The Ahrar continued to articulate economic grievances in Islamic terms, but with a new twist; it tied the demand for economic justice to the Islamicity of the state by questioning the status of the Ahmadis. Every harangue against government policy and demand for greater Islamicity were accompanied by complaints about the discrepancy between the wealth of the Ahmadi community and the poverty of the struggling Muslim masses: in the homeland of Muslims, it was the Ahmadis who reaped the benefits and the Muslims who suffered hunger and hardship. This strategy was by and large successful, though it was the Ahmadis themselves who set off the final conflict. Zafaru’llah Khan played directly into the Ahrar’s hands. On May 17, 1952, the foreign minister turned down Prime Minister Nazimu’ddin’s pleas of caution and addressed a public Ahmadi session in Karachi. By openly admitting his religion, Zafaru’llah Khan gave credence to the charge made by the Ahrar that the government was “controlled” by the Ahmadis. For the other Islamic groups and the ulama, who viewed the Ahmadis with opprobrium, the very presence of an Ahmadi minister in the cabinet was proof of the un-Islamicity of the state. The Ahrar and the ulama, infuriated by the foreign minister’s action, organized a protest march; the marchers clashed with the Ahmadis, and there was a riot.

On May 18, Sayyid Sulaiman Nadwi, Pakistan’s new spiritual leader, convened an ulama board to formulate an official policy. Shaikh Sultan Ahmad represented the Jama‘at on the board. The board demanded that the Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority, that Zafaru’llah Khan be removed from his cabinet post, and that all key government jobs be cleansed of Ahmadis. The board also elected a majlis-i ‘amal (council of action) to implement its recommendations. Amin Ahsan Islahi became the vice-president of this majlis, and Malik Nasru’llah Khan ‘Aziz one of its members.

The Jama‘at’s shura’ considered the unfolding events: a number of the Jama‘at leaders, including Sultan Ahmad, Islahi, and Nasru’llah Khan ‘Aziz, favored the party’s wholehearted participation in the agitations as a policy natural for the holy community to support; Mawdudi, who was keen on formalizing the Jama‘at’s political role, was reluctant to approve. He argued that the Ahmadi issue would be resolved automatically once the country was Islamized and that in the meantime riots would only tarnish the image of the Islamic groups, lessen the appeal of an Islamic constitution, and, by playing into the hands of the opponents of Islamization, was bound to derail the whole campaign for an Islamic state. The holy community’s choice of policy could not be premised on religious considerations alone; it had to be examined in light of the party’s political aims. Mawdudi was, moreover, not keen on alliance with the Ahrar built around the Ahmadi issue or any other cause. He never subscribed to the kind of impassioned denunciations which characterized the ulama or the Ahrar’s encounters with them. Mawdudi had always believed that proper Islamization would “reconvert” the Ahmadis to Islam, and the Islamic state would find a political solution to their place in society.[70] However, even among the Jama‘at’s members there was support for the riots. It was clear that they could open up contacts with the Punjabi masses, whose politics had thus far been dominated by landowners and pirs. Until then the Muhajirs had served as the Islamic parties’ main constituency; now the Islam League, Ahrar, and the anti-Ahmadi riots had opened Punjabi politics to the Islamic groups. Given its political objectives, the Jama‘at could not ignore the opportunity. The desire to sustain the momentum for an Islamic constitution had to be balanced against the opportunities the agitations presented.

The shura’, therefore, would not give its wholehearted endorsement to the majlis-i ‘amal, then dominated by the Ahrar; but in recognition of the preeminence of the Ahmadi issue, it incorporated the demands of the majlis-i ‘amal into its own constitutional proposals. The August 1952 issue of the Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an carried a lengthy denunciation of the Ahmadis written by Mawdudi, and promised to include the demand for their exclusion from Islam into the Jama‘at’s proposals for an Islamic constitution. The Jama‘at members who sat on the majlis-i ‘amal, in keeping with Mawdudi’s views, sought to temper the Ahrar’s violence, but when they failed, the Jama‘at officially dissociated itself from the majlis-i ‘amal on February 26, 1953.[71]

Between July 1952 and January 1953, Mawdudi had lobbied the ulama against the agitations, hoping instead to keep their attention on the Islamic constitution and to preserve the alliance which had produced the Objectives Resolution, repeating the argument that the Islamic constitution would provide a solution to the Ahmadi issue along with a host of other problems. Mawdudi was increasingly worried about what effect the riots were having on the government of Nazimu’ddin, which the Jama‘at regarded as an asset, and about the distraction they presented from the constitutional cause. In June 1952, when the Ahrar were busy with their campaign against the Ahmadis, the Jama‘at launched a nationwide drive to collect signatures in support of the Islamic constitution. In July, as the agitations grew worse, the Jama‘at demanded that the government reveal the contents of the Basic Principles Committee report before the assembly convened in order to ascertain its Islamicity. There followed a joint declaration of the Jama‘at and other ulama parties to hold a “Constitution Day” in Karachi on December 19, 1952, which the American envoy called “the only effort in Karachi on behalf of the constitution.”[72] Finally, in January 1953, when the Ahrar were engaged in fine-tuning their anti-Ahmadi campaign, the Jama‘at joined the Jinnah Awami League, the Awami League, and the Azad Pakistan party in opposing the Muslim League by objecting to the committee’s report.[73] The Jama‘at, however, failed to redirect national attention away from the Ahmadi issue. The majlis-i ‘amal, dominated by the Ahrar, and nudged along by Daultana and the Punjab Muslim League,[74]proved a more decisive force in determining the position of the ulama than Mawdudi’s cautions.

In July 1952 the Punjab government imposed Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code restricting public gatherings. On July 19 the Ahrar organized a large demonstration in Multan which culminated in clashes with the police and the deaths of six people. Fearful of further escalation, Daultana sought to reign the Ahrar in, though his approach remained conciliatory. On July 21, after securing from the Ahrar a promise to help restore order, the Punjab government lifted the Section 144 restrictions and the ban on the Ahrar’s paper, Azad. A week later, in a gesture of conciliation, upon the insistence of Daultana[75] “the council of Punjab Muslim League…adopted a resolution by a vote of 264 against eight in support of the anti-Ahmediya agitation.”[76]Given the Punjab government’s response, the Ahrar found more reason to push for a showdown. On July 27, despite the Muslim League’s endorsement of the Ahrar’s position, it demonstrated against the League in Punjab and assaulted its councilmen.[77] Daultana ordered the arrest of some 137 people and put Punjab under heavy police protection.[78] The breakdown in the constitutional effort, which Mawdudi had feared, soon followed.

After a brief lull in January 1953, the Ahrar resumed its campaign in full force, and by arguing that the Muslim League resolution was not definitive enough again mobilized the ulama. Sacrificing their greater interests in the Islamization of Pakistan, the ulama, including the Jama‘at leader, Sultan Ahmad, gave Nazimu’ddin an ultimatum: either sack Zafaru’llah Khan and declare the Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority within a month or face “direct action”—a euphemism for widescale riots.[79]

Nazimu’ddin had initially tried to win over the agitators by expressing sympathy for the anti-Ahmadi cause. But he had refused to ask for Zafaru’llah Khan’s resignation, because in his view such a move would have upset the United States—which regarded Zafaru’llah Khan as an ally—and jeopardized the grain aid, which, given the gravity of food shortages in Punjab, was a risk he could not take.[80] On August 14 he issued a decree which forbade those holding public office from proselytizing, an open reference to the Ahmadis and Zafaru’llah Khan, but this too failed to subdue the agitations, and he soon came under pressure to take a tougher stand. At this point he changed his strategy completely. He initiated a virulent attack against the ulama in the press that, given his reputation for piety, was a bolt out of the blue for the majlis-i ‘amal and a cause for remorse for Mawdudi. When his trip to Lahore on February 16 was marked by strikes and black-flag demonstrations and the agitators threatened to carry their protest to Karachi on the occasion of Zafaru’llah Khan’s return from abroad, the government reacted swiftly; on February 27 it ordered a number of ulama and Ahrar leaders to be rounded up and placed in protective custody.

Mawdudi was no longer able to remain aloof. The constitutional debates were set aside. The government and the Islamic parties were now clearly on opposite sides, and the loyalties of the Jama‘at naturally lay with the latter. The Ahrar’s meteoric rise to prominence and the direction public opinion was taking led the Jama‘at to reassess its own approach to the crisis. Mawdudi and Sultan Ahmad participated in an all-Muslim parties convention in January 1953, where they approved the declaration of the session which demanded the resignation of Nazimu’ddin.[81] Mawdudi then joined the majlis-i ‘amal, but quickly withdrew.[82] Mawdudi and the Jama‘at became entangled in the agitations, which between February and March spread throughout Punjab. On March 5, 1953, Mawdudi published the most systematic denunciation of the Ahmadis since the beginning of the crisis: Qadiyani Mas’alah (The Ahmadi Problem). It was designed to establish his primacy in the religious circles, to confirm his religious credentials before the ulama who had chastised him for not supporting the agitations, and to upstage the Ahrar. In doing so, the book placed Mawdudi squarely at the center of the controversy.[83] True to form, Mawdudi, who was opposed to the agitations, now became their leading figure.

The federal cabinet, although disturbed by Daultana’s machinations, continued to vacillate. General Iskandar Mirza—the doyen of the bureaucracy and the defense secretary—was, however, sufficiently alarmed by the rising tide of agitations in Punjab, and especially by the Punjab government’s decision to endorse openly the demands of the agitators to act. On March 6, the Punjab government, in its capacity as the representative of the people of Punjab, dispatched a provincial minister to Karachi to put before the central government the demands of the agitators and push for the dismissal of Zafaru’llah Khan.[84] Viewing Nazimu’ddin’s indecision and Daultana’s “flirtations with the mullahs as yet another example of the ineptitude and destructive potential of the politicians,” on March 6 General Mirza ordered General A‘zam Khan to place Punjab under martial law.[85] Soon thereafter Daultana resigned, and Mawdudi, along with Mawlana ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi (the minister for religious affairs from 1990 to 1993) and a number of Ahrar leaders, was arrested.

Mawdudi was charged with violating martial-law regulations and “promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between different groups in Pakistan” by publishing the Qadiyani Mas’alah, as well as inflammatory articles in Tasnim.[86] Some twelve Jama‘at leaders, including Islahi and Mian Tufayl, and twenty-eight workers, including the publisher of the Qadiyani Mas’alah, were also held on these charges; and Jama‘at’s newspapers, Kawthar and Tasnim, were closed down.[87] The Jama‘at’s headquarters were raided, and its papers and funds were confiscated. Mawdudi, the editor of Tasnim, and the publisher of Qadiyani Mas’alah, would be tried on charges of sedition in May.

The anti-Ahmadi agitations, as Mawdudi had feared, proved to be the undoing of Nazimu’ddin, and a major setback for the Islamic constitution. With martial law in place in Punjab, and a climate of uncertainty and crisis reigning in the country, the governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad, found ample room for maneuvering and summarily dismissed Nazimu’ddin on April 17, 1953. In this he was backed by leaders such as General Mirza who had already taken issue with Nazimu’ddin’s “flirtations with the mullahs” and placed the entire responsibility for the crisis in Punjab on his shoulders.[88]

The pious Nazimu’ddin was replaced by the more secular Muhammad ‘Ali Bugra. The change was immediately reflected in the constitutional debates. The Constituent Assembly played down the Islamic provisions of the Basic Principles Committee report, and the interim constitutional proposals of June 1953 did not even mention the hitherto agreed-upon provisions regarding the place of Islam in the constitution.[89] A special court of inquiry was set up under the supervision of Muhammad Munir, the chief justice of the supreme court of Pakistan, to look into the roots of the agitation in Punjab and to roll back the gains made by Islamic groups. The power of religious activists was effectively reduced by the adroit Justice Munir, who depicted them as incompetent judges of how to run a modern state. The inability of the ulama and the lay religious activists to produce a unanimous response to such axiomatic queries as “the meaning of a Muslim” led to the conclusion that no such definition of Islam, let alone of an Islamic constitution, existed and that the religious experts were best advised to leave the constitution-making process alone and concentrate on putting their own house in order.

Munir’s incisive inquiry, known popularly as the “Munir Report,” was later singled out as the most celebrated “modernist” expression of backlash against Islamic activism and an indictment of religious activism, an act of bravado allowed by the change in the balance between the government and the Islamic parties. Munir’s inquiry continues to cast its shadow over the activities of the sundry Islamic parties in Pakistan to this day.

By blaming Pakistan’s developmental crisis on the “perfidious” meddling of the Islamic parties in politics, the Munir Report turned the central question before the Pakistan state on its head. Islam was depicted as an unwelcome intruder into the political arena and an impediment to national development. What the Munir Report failed to realize was that, as deficient as the program of the Islamic groups may have been, in the absence of representative institutions, national elections, national parties with a strong organizational apparatus and a meaningful political platform, and shared national values Islam was all Pakistanis had in the way of a cohesive force, and that was the very reason why politicians had continued to appeal to it. In a society with arrested political development and state formation and deeply divided along ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian lines, Islam had become the intermediary between state and society, the more so as the former had faltered and the latter grown unruly. Islam could not be selectively appealed to and then successfully manipulated. Forays into the domain of the ulama and the Islamic groups by politicians and the resultant sacralization of the political discourse could generate uncontrollable and undesirable outcomes. Costs and responsibilities had to be shouldered by Jinnah, Liaqat ‘Ali Khan, Nazimu’ddin, and Daultana, to name only a few of Pakistan’s political leaders of the time, as well as by those whom the Munir Report sought to implicate.[90] By inviting Islam into the political arena, it was the politicians, and not the Islamic activists, who confirmed the centrality of Islam to the national political discourse.

The same motives that governed the politicians’ appealing to Islam now conditioned the role of Islam in the politics of the masses. Just as the politicians had opened the door to political activism by the Islamic parties, so had the masses. With no national elections in which to express their demands, nor any national parties to represent their interests rather than those of the elite, the masses, whose commitment to Islamization until that point was by no means certain, turned to Islamic slogans and Islamic parties to express their political demands and vent their frustrations. But as the Punjab crisis indicated, neither the ruling elite nor the masses were capable of controlling the flow of Islam into politics or the sacralization of the national political discourse. Munir had really focused on the symptoms rather than the causes of that sacralization. The lesson of the Punjab crisis might have eluded Munir but not the military and bureaucratic elite. From it they concluded that secularism was the handmaiden of political stability, and, moreover, only an apolitical polity could help bring about a secular society.

Politicians and Islamic activists alike agreed that what happened in Punjab was a testament to the emotive power of Islamic symbols. The ulama and Mawdudi may be ridiculed, but in the absence of nationally shared values or a viable state ideology they were bound to rise again. The Munir Report was the last attempt to extricate Islam from Pakistan’s politics; neither Munir nor Ghulam Muhammad, nor in later years, Ayub Khan, however, could find a substitute for its role. Islam held the state together. Whenever Pakistan fell into crisis in the years to follow, politicians and people alike appealed to Islam’s symbols and loyalties to construct political programs and social movements, thereby expanding the wedge through which Islamic groups entered the political arena. As Justice Munir was busy systematically rolling back the gains made by the Islamic parties, Nuru’l-Amin, the chief minister of East Pakistan, told Prime Minister Bugra that “Islam was the League’s one hope of warding off defeat in east Bengal”[91] and keeping the wayward province under Karachi’s control. He then assured the public that the Muslim League was determined “to give the country a full-fledged Islamic Constitution within six months.”[92]

Changes in the political climate in 1953 also proved to be a problem in the Jama‘at’s legal battles. In May the military tribunal convened to determine the fate of those arrested in Punjab. After a brief trial, on May 8 the tribunal found Mawlana ‘Abdu’ssattar Niyazi and on May 11, Mawdudi, guilty of sedition; both were sentenced to death. Many among Pakistan’s leaders were convinced that India was behind the Punjab disturbances, which made Mawdudi and Niyazi guilty not only of sedition but also of treason.[93] This, however, does not explain why the harshest sentences were reserved for only these two religious leaders. The tribunal also sentenced the publishers of Tasnim and Qadiyani Mas’alah to three and nine years in jail, respectively. The sentences were unexpectedly harsh, and in the case of Mawdudi was thought by many to be incommensurate to his role in the entire affair, which was limited to having published the Qadiyani Mas’alah, and even that book had been published the day before martial law was declared. In effect, Mawdudi had been arrested for violating a martial law ordinance that had not yet existed when the book was published. Mawdudi’s writings were hardly as inflammatory as those of the Ahrar leaders, none of whom received as severe a punishment. Even more perplexing, the most active of the Jama‘at’s leaders, Sultan Ahmad, had not even been arrested, and Mawdudi had received the same sentence as Niyazi, whose incendiary speeches had directly incited violence and on one occasion had led to the murder of a policeman outside of the mosque where Niyazi was preaching. The American consul-general in Lahore reported that the chief of the intelligence directorate of Punjab told him that “there is no evidence “as yet’ that Jamaat-i-Islami as a party was involved in the riots. He stated the arrests had been made of individuals against whom there was some evidence of participation in the riots…. He was sure a good case would be made” (emphasis in the original).[94]

The government was fully aware that the public regarded its case against Mawdudi to be weak. It had been hard-pressed even to explain his arrest. Four days before Mawdudi’s sentencing, Justice Munir told the consul that “he [had] already been getting many informal petitions and letters challenging the legal validity of actions taken under Martial Law and especially of cases tried under Courts Martial which in many cases meted out severe sentences.”[95] If the army, Justice Munir, or the secularist elite had thought they could cleanse the politics of Islamic parties this way, they were wrong. Nazimu’ddin criticized the sentence, and even offered to sign a petition for mercy for Mawdudi.[96] Prime Minister Bugra, too, was surprised with the sentence and remarked that Mawdudi could appeal, and should he do so would get a most sympathetic hearing.[97] Martial law and the persecution of religious groups proved to be highly unpopular enterprises, which only made heroes of the accused.[98] On May 13, Mawdudi’s sentence was reduced to fourteen years.

The Jama‘at, however, was not assuaged and continued to clamor for justice. On May 21 four Jama‘at leaders were arrested for protesting Mawdudi’s fourteen-year sentence, but they continued their campaign for his release and complained of government vindictiveness and strong-arm tactics toward their party. On June 18, 1954, for instance, Sultan Ahmad, the provisional amir of the Jama‘at, declared that Mawdudi’s arrest and sentence had nothing to do with the anti-Ahmadi agitations, and everything to do with his constitutional proposals.[99] Echoing a general sentiment among the Islamic parties, Sultan Ahmad stated that the government’s reaction to the agitations was merely a pretext for eliminating stumbling blocks to the passage of a secular constitution.[100] Justice Munir’s probing into the politics of Islamic activists under the pretext of determining the causes of the Punjab agitations had only added to their suspicions. Many religious leaders, including those in the Jama‘at, charged that the court of inquiry was better advised to look for the cause of agitation in economic injustice and the political maneuverings of Daultana.

Some in the military and the bureaucracy saw the Punjab agitations and the five-year campaign for an Islamic constitution as interrelated, and therefore believed that Mawdudi’s crime extended beyond his role in the Punjab agitations. Zafaru’llah Khan and Iskandar Mirza claimed that Mawdudi was “one of the most dangerous men in Pakistan,”[101] guilty of generating a national crisis. Munir himself believed that the Jama‘at had as “its objective the replacement of the present form of Government by a Government of the Jamaat’s conception,”[102] a point that was hardly new since the Jama‘at had openly advocated the establishment of a government to its liking since setting foot in Pakistan. But now the Jama‘at’s campaign for Islamization was depicted as a seditious undertaking whose result was the Punjab crisis. It followed that there existed no difference between Mawdudi’s apparently academic activities and Niyazi’s manipulation of the mob.

Mawdudi himself remained unapologetic. While he may have received assurances regarding the outcome of his case from Muslim League leaders,[103]he forbade his followers from seeking clemency on his behalf. They did, however, stage a number of strikes and street demonstrations decrying the “injustice.” To the government’s dismay, Mawdudi was gradually becoming a hero.

Reacting to pressures from within, reluctant to carry out the sentences against Mawdudi and Niyazi,[104] and dismayed by the Jama‘at’s success in arguing its case before the public, the government grew conciliatory. Mian Muhammad Sharif, a judge of the supreme court, was appointed by the government to review the tribunal’s judgment. Sharif recommended that the martial law administration commute the sentences. By the end of 1953 most of the Jama‘at’s workers had been freed, and in March 1954 Islahi was released. Mawdudi, however, was to be kept away for as long as the government could manage. The court, however, once again proved to be a boon for the Jama‘at. Following the ruling of the federal court on a petition of habeas corpus for two defendants in the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, Mawdudi and Niyazi filed a habeas corpus petition before the Lahore High Court in April. However, before the court could render a verdict, the government remitted Mawdudi and Niyazi’s sentences. After two years in prison, Mawdudi was released on April 29, 1955. Already a hero, he quickly became the spokesman for a religious alliance whose zeal he was determined to rekindle.[105]

 

Ahmadi’s wanted to be non-Muslim in 1946-1947, just to give the Gurdaspur district to India during the Radcliff Commission

Intro
The Mirza family played a shrill game of politics in terms of the partition of India.  Zafrullah Khan and the Mirza family single handedly split up India per the British Governments request.  The Ahmadi’s were promised compensation and received it promptly when the govt. of Pakistan allowed the Mirza family to buy rabwah and run it as a state within a state, as well as a 99-year lease.  Interestingly enough, outwardly, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad (The Khalifa) was against the creation of Pakistan.  However, he was lying, and most likely just trying to keep the heat off of him, behind the scenes, he knew everything about the partition and was planning for it, in fact, he got a military escort as he fled from Qadian to Lahore during partition.

Scans

Some additional data

Source: Speech in Al Fazal from 13 Nov. 1946:

https://old.reddit.com/r/Ahmadiyya_Truth/comments/93ctjc/ahmadiyya_caliph_asks_british_government_to/

Consequently Ahmadis were not counted as Muslims when it came to divide India into Muslim Majority Pakistan and India.

This had some significant impact in some areas.

The Gurdaspur District in Punjab, where Qadian, the Ahmadi headquarter is located lost its narrow Muslim Majority and was awarded to India, giving India a considerably strategic advantage of a Quick access to Kashmir, that would prove essential for the Wars against Pakistan for Kashmir.

The entire district of Gurdaspur had a bare majority of 50.2% Muslims.[57] (In the `notional’ award attached to the Indian Independence Act, all of Gurdaspur district was marked as Pakistan with 51.14% Muslim majority.[58] In the 1901 census, the population of Gurdaspur district was 49% Muslim, 40% Hindu, and 10% Sikh.[59]) The Pathankot tehsil was predominantly Hindu while the other three tehsils were Muslim majority.[60] In the event, only Shakargarh was awarded to Pakistan. “

” The major part of Gurdaspur district, i.e. three of the four sub-districts and a small part of the fourth, had been handed over to India giving India practical land access to Kashmir, thus making the Indian intervention in Kashmir possible.[66] It came as a great blow to Pakistan. Jinnah and other leaders of Pakistan, and particularly its officials, criticized the Award as ‘extremely unjust and unfair’.[67] “

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radcliffe_Line#Pakistani_View_on_the_Award_of_Gurdaspur_to_India

The Indian Perspective:

” New Delhi: If it was not for a last minute change of plan by Radcliffe, the entire Gurdaspur would have been a part of Pakistan when the line was drawn on land and on hearts of millions of Punjabis.

Eventually, only the Shakargarh tehsil – which was on the other side of River Ravi, was awarded to the new country.

This despite Muslims – when including Ahmadiyya sect – being in majority in the district in 1947.”

Source: http://zeenews.india.com/news/india/punjab-terror-attack-what-makes-gurdaspur-so-vulnerable_1637105.html

The Pakistani perspective:

Stockholm University Professor Emeritus Ishtiaq Ahmed said :

” He was addressing a seminar on the partition of India and its impact on the Punjab at the Information Technology University. Ahmed said Pakistan’s claim on Gurdaspur was feeble as Ahmadis constituted a prominent part of the population in the area. He said Muslims in the district constituted a minority if members of the Jamaat Ahmadiyya were not counted among their ranks. “

https://tribune.com.pk/story/890866/cracking-india-muslims-perpetrated-communal-disturbances/

The image above shows the protocol of the National Assembly Hearing which resulted in Ahmadis being declared non-Muslim per constituional amendment in Pakistan. In that hearing that exact fact was brought forward in the presence of the Ahamdiyya Khalifa number 3 and 4, Mirza Nasir Ahmad and Mirza Tahir Ahmad arguing that Ahmadis had caused lasting damage to India’s Muslims and Pakistanis by asking the British Government to be counted as Non-Muslims when it came to India’s Partition and thus ensuring that Pakistan lost out on Gurdaspur District and a large part of Punjab and ultimately by giving India a starteigc advantage in the fight for Kashmir.

Source: https://archive.org/details/NAProceedings1974 Page 367.

So both India and Pakistan Agree that Ahmadis are to blame for Gurdaspur beeing lost to India and resulting a strategic disadvanatage for Pakistan in the fight for Muslim majority Kashmir. Had the Gurdaspur district not been handed to India, Pakistan most likely would have been able to capture all of Kashmir and end the conflict quickly, but instead India was given the possibility to counter Pakistan and allow a decade long and costly war for both sides, which has impacted the develeopment of both countries for the last century and casued misery for the population of both countries..

The Mirza family refuses to erase the Kalima from their mosques in Pakistan

Intro
I’m sure everyone is following the recent #faisalabadmosqueattack.  New details have emerged.  It seems that Ahmadi’s purposely started a fire to their own mosque per the direction of their local leaders.  Nonetheless, new pictures have emerged with show that arabic that was illegally written on the mosque, has been removed.

Why doesn’t the Ahmadiyya Jamaat just erase them?  
The Mirza family owns 100+ mosques in Pakistan, they purposely won’t remove the Kalima from them, thus, whenever there is an incident around an Ahmadiyya place of worship, it is always noticed and thus removed by the local authorities.  But that begs the question, why doesn’t the Ahmadiyya jamaat just remove them and avoid all of this trouble? The answer is the asylum scam that the Mirza family is running. 

Tags

Zahid Aziz vs. Bashir Ahmad Misri

Intro
Bashir Ahmad Misri has stamped his place in the world of Ex-Ahmadi’s.  We found additional data wherein a famous Lahori-Ahmadi, Zahid Aziz commented on the statements of Bashir Ahmad Misri.

The link
http://www.ahmadiyya.org/uk/light-apr07.pdf

Tags
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #ahmadiyyat #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Sialkot #Mosqueattack

 

Akber Choudhry explains how the Mirza family is using asylum cases to fuel their family business

Intro
Our beloved friend Akber Chaudhry has just written an excellent article on the Mirza family and its modus operandi.  Check it out.

The link
http://www.qern.org/shrill-religious-cult-digs-a-deeper-political-hole/

The full essay

/1974

Shrill Religious Cult Digs a Deeper Political Hole

The leadership of the Ahmadiyya (Qadiani group) has a penchant for exaggeration and shrillness when it comes to their country of origin – Pakistan.  To replenish the dwindling stock of tithe-payers in Western currencies, the family (Mirza) leadership of the cult resorts to controversy that can underline a claim of persecution and thus move poor Pakistani Qadianis to the West, where many educated ones will eventually leave the outlandish teachings of the cult.  And so the refugee-provocation cycle continues and ends up in riches for the Mirza family that has run this religious outfit for more than a century.

Meanwhile, poor Ahmadis remains marginalized in Pakistani society and much can be done by a sincere Qadiani leadership to help any incoming Pakistani government to relieve any discrimination that the group believes that it faces.  Instead, the Qadiani leadership welcomes every government with verbal jabs and slaps based on  half-truths.  This only makes the life of the common Ahmadi in Pakistan harder and only serves to increase the wealth of the Mirza family.

Once again with the July 2018 election of Imran Khan, the official spokesperson of the Ahmadiyya goes all out to provoke the incoming government, and it falls on us to dismantle the fallacies one by one and to convince the new government that the frantic tone should not be taken seriously and the followers of the cult be protected from the political miscalculations of their leadership.

Here is the opinion piece by the official spokesperson: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/07/29/imran-khan-must-help-end-the-persecution-of-pakistans-ahmadi-muslims/

Derogatory Introduction

  1. ‘athlete-turned-politician Imran Khan’ – not the most accurate way to describe the former cricket captain of Pakistan who retired from sports 26 years ago and has been a philanthropist and politician for longer than he ever was a sportsman.
  2. ‘the Khan regime foreshadows immense hardship and violence for Pakistan’s religious minorities’ – the words ‘regime’, ‘immense’ and ‘violence’ should be used for India, where the partner of the ruling government has vowed to ‘eradicate Islam and Christianity from India by 2021.’

Stroke of a Pen?

a feat literally a pen stroke away . . . .  Thus, Khan can prove his commitment to justice by demanding a repeal of Pakistan’s second [constitutional] amendment . . . , the 1984 anti-Ahmadi ordinance mandating fines and arrest for Ahmadis identifying as Muslim, and the 1986 blasphemy law . . . .

Perhaps conditioned within a totalitarian cult, the author does not recognize the complexity and political will required to amend the Constitution (repeal means a new Act and a new constitutional amendment) or the frameworks built upon the Constitution.  These measures are neither popular nor required so the political will does not exit.  For purposes of the Constitution of Pakistan, Ahmadis of both Qadiani and Lahori groups are non-Muslim.  They can label themselves whatever they want within their private communications, but cannot self-advertise as Muslims in a Muslim-majority country and any laws based on the Constitution will not recognize them as Muslims – and that is how it is in many other Muslim countries in the world.  How naive to think that a stroke of the pen can change that!

The status of Ahmadis in many Muslim countries is similar to the differing status of Mormons and Scientologists in various Western jurisdictions.

History of Qadiani Political Misadventures

Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented monolithic political manipulation in the 1971 elections by the Ahmadi leadership, engineered by their future leader, Mirza Tahir Ahmad.  The group voted en bloc for the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and later became embittered with the party when it won and would not accede to their unreasonable demands.

A misguided show of strength by the cult, that turned violent at a train station, resulted in the judicial finding that the Qadiani leadership ran a ‘state-within-a-state’.  After Parliamentary hearings where the Qadiani Ahmadi leader presented for days, the constitutional amendment that declared them non-Muslim was passed – a direct result of the political misadventures of the Mirza family.

Separate Voter List on Challenge

The Ahmadis are respectable first-class Pakistani citizens, but it appear from the hasty executive order of 2002 that the electoral stipulation for a separate list is to prevent future political shenanigans by the Qadiani leadership.  Thus, it empowers an Ahmadi Pakistani citizen to vote with their conscience and not by the whim and whip of their leader.  The separate list is not mandatory and does not bar an Ahmadi from voting for any candidate or party.  However, it can be useful to detect manipulation of the vote of an Ahmadi citizen by a religious cult leader as has happened in the past.

The current electoral rules regarding Ahmadi voters (not candidates) are not perfect and can be improved upon.  Any constructive ideas are welcome and we will advocate them if they address the concerns of the majority as well as the minority.  For starters, the Qadiani leadership can make a genuine commitment to allowing their followers freedom of conscience when it comes to elections.  Asking for a ‘stroke of the pen’ is too naive a request for the author and again reeks of political provocation.

Peculiar or a ‘Cult Miracle’?

Peculiar but significant is that every Pakistani prime minister or president, from Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif, persecuted Ahmadi Muslims — and each ultimately succumbed to the extremism or corruption they enabled.

This statement gives a glimpse into the oft-spoken but never-written cult belief that every ruler of Pakistan will meet with ignominy until the legal status of the Ahmadis in Pakistan is reversed.  The author could not put it cogently so he lumped prime ministers and presidents together – whose respective powers have changed considerably – and Bhutto and Sharif were both prime ministers.

Extremism and corruption are steadily on the decline in Pakistan according to accepted international benchmarks.  This statement is nothing but political provocation that does not help the cause of the common Ahmadi in Pakistan.

On the other hand, accountability for the offshore companies and money laundering enabled by the Mirza family is nowhere to be seen, and the Qadiani leadership has been very silent about it.

The proverbial charity, especially for a religious organization, should begin at home.
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#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #ahmadiyyat #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Sialkot #Mosqueattack

 

The Yuz Asaf Story from Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyya

Intro
Tarikh–i-Ahmadiyya is the main history book of Ahmadiyya INC.  But it’s only in Urdu, every once in a while, we get snippets translated.  In today’s essay, we have a snippet which explains how MGA and his team landed on the Yuz Asaf theory, i.e. that Esa (as) died in Kashmir.

The story

This is from Tareekh Ahmadiayat vol 3 page 152. This volume is dedicated only to the life and times of Moulvi Noor Uddin Behrvi. PLEASE REMEMBER THAT THERE WERE 2 NOOR UDDINS IN AHMADIYYA HISTORY,THEY WERE BOTH EMPLOYED IN KASHMIR DERBAR AT THE SAME TIME. One was the Noor uddin who became the first successor in qadiani movement. The other one who this narration belong to KHALIFA NOOR UDDIN JAMOONI. If you have read the history of kashmir, this person was also employed in kashmir derbar. His picture is on alislam website.
This is how this Narration goes:

Title: DISCOVERY OF THE GRAVE OF HAZRAT EISA
Khalifa Noor uddin Jamooni relates to us that “once I was walking through Mohala Khaniyar (Siri Nagar) that I saw an old man and an old woman (a couple) sitting at (beside) a qabar (grave). I asked them whose grave it was? They told me that it is of a Nabi Sahib. And this grave was famous as, grave of Yus Asif, Shehzada Nabi and peaghamber sahib. I asked them, “where /how a Nabi could come here from”. They told me this Nabi, many hundreds year ago came from a very far land. I TOLD THIS TO MOULVI SAHIB (as you know that they were both in kashmir, noor uddin the first successor). And much time passed after this event (iss waqiya ko aik arsa guzar giya). After that, Moulvi sahib left his employment (at the death of ranbhir singh in 1885, many courtiers were laid of) and Moulvi Noor uddin came to qadian (to live). ONE DAY IN THE MAJLIS OF HAZRAT MASIH MAOUD (in a gathering WITH Mirza ghulam) where hazrat moulvi sahib was present, Hazrat masih maoud qouted an Ayat (the ayat in which rawah is mentioned) and said, it seems to me, and it is possible that Hazrat Eisa AS went towards a place like Kashmir (so mirza ghulam was not sure and had no idea at the time, so there was not wahi or ilham present from Allah SWT). On that hazrat Khalifa Awal related my rawaiyat (incident with the old couple as he had already told noor uddin the successor in the past). Hazoor called me (noor uddin jamooni) and ordered to INVESTIGATE AND RESEARCH about this grave.(to find out more about the grave) in other words IT HAS BEEN A COMPLETE FABRICATION

The scan work

Tags
#ahmadiyya #ahmadiyyatrueislam #ahmadiapartheid #Ahmadiyyat #rabwah #qadian #meetthekhalifa #ahmadiyyat #muslimsforpeace #ahmadiyyafactcheckblog #nolifewithoutkhalifa #drsalam #AhmadiMosqueattack #AhmadiyyaPersecution #Sialkot #Mosqueattack

 

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